Essays on economics of education by Baker, Olesya Nicole
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2013
Essays on economics of education
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/14118
Boston University
 
 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
 
by 
 
OLESYA N. BAKER 
B.A., University of California, 2003 
M.A., Northwestern University, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ©  Copyright by 
          OLESYA N. BAKER 
          2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Reader  ______________________________________________ 
    Kevin Lang, Ph.D. 
    Professor of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 Second Reader ______________________________________________ 
    Daniele Paserman, Ph.D. 
    Professor of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 Third Reader  ______________________________________________ 
    Kehinde Ajayi, Ph.D. 
    Assistant Professor of Economics
 
 iv 
Acknowledgments 
 
First of all, I am deeply indebted to my main advisor and co-author, Kevin Lang, 
for his constant guidance and support. His encouragement, assistance and constructive 
feedbacks enabled me to greatly enrich my understanding of Economics and to 
successfully complete this dissertation. Kevin’s patience and understanding also helped 
me juggle the demanding dual roles of a graduate student and a mother and were 
instrumental in helping me overcome challenging stages of the PhD.  
I am also grateful to Daniele Paserman, my second reader and a co-author, for 
being demanding of my work and holding me to a high research standard. I have grown 
as a researcher because of him. I also would like to thank Kehinde Ajayi, my third reader, 
for her excellent comments, encouragement and job market advice. I also thank Claudia 
Olivetti for helping me come to Boston University and for mentoring me during my years 
as a graduate student. 
I am grateful to all of my classmates who were an invaluable source of emotional 
and academic support during these years: Miguel Ampudia, Tim Bond, Lucia Esposito, 
Emily Gee, Rania Ghileb, Osea Guintella, Ana Nuevo-Chiquero, Guillem Riambau-
Armet, Myongjin Kim, Sarah Kroeger, Giulia LaMattina, Anusha Nath, Francisco Pino, 
Luz Magdalena Salas, and Denis Tkachenko.  
Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without my family. My 
mom’s unconditional love and belief in me was the key reason I started and continued on 
the path to a PhD. I thank her for being there for me every step of the way. To my 
 
 v 
husband, whose understanding, encouragement, love and support helped me get through 
the toughest days – I learn from you, I admire you and I love you. This dissertation is 
dedicated to my son, who had to spend almost every weekend hanging out at a museum 
with his dad, while it was being written. 
  
 
 vi 
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 
(Order No.                         ) 
OLESYA N. BAKER 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2013 
Major Professor: Kevin Lang, Professor of Economics 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the effectiveness and consequences of three distinct 
education policies. 
The first chapter analyzes the effects of high school exit exams on high school 
graduation, employment and wage outcomes. We construct a state-graduation year cohort 
dataset using the Current Population Survey data, US Census data and information on the 
timing and difficulty of exit exams in different states. Using this dataset we analyze 
within-state variation in outcomes over time. Overall, we find relatively modest effects of 
high school exit exams. We do not find consistent effects on graduation rates for exit 
exams that assess academic skills taught below the high school level; however, we find 
that more challenging standards-based exams reduce graduation rates. We also find that 
about one-half of this reduction in graduation rates is offset by an increase in GED rates. 
 
 vii 
We do not find consistent effects of exit exams on labor market outcomes or on the 
distribution of wages.  
Chapter two analyzes the institutional consequences of the California Class-Size 
Reduction (CSR) program. This program provides incentive funding if schools limit class 
size in grades K-3 to twenty or fewer students. We find that, in response to these 
incentives, some schools and school districts limit their enrollment levels to maximize the 
CSR subsidy payment. In order to achieve these enrollment levels, schools reassign 
students above the desired enrollment thresholds to nearby schools or nearby school 
districts. We also find that schools that limit their enrollments are well-performing 
schools with a low percentage of students who receive free or reduced price meals. 
The last chapter analyzes the academic consequences of a rank-based university 
admission program called the Texas Top 10 Percent Law. I compare academic 
performance of rank-eligible students who attended UT Austin before and after the law 
went into effect. To account for grade inflation I use a difference-in-differences 
framework with students not eligible for rank-based admissions as controls and use 
propensity score matching methods to correct for changes in academic quality of the 
control group. Both the baseline and the propensity-adjusted estimates suggest that mean 
college GPA of rank-admitted students declined after the law. 
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1. The Effect of High School Exit Exams on Graduation, Employment and Wages, 
with Kevin Lang 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The number of states that have adopted high school exit exams has increased 
dramatically in the last three decades. The idea behind the implementation of exit exams 
was to clarify what high school students should know by the time they graduate and to 
ensure that a high school diploma is associated with a certain level of academic quality. 
Students who do not pass all portions of the high school exit exam cannot obtain a high 
school diploma, and this high-stakes nature of exit exams has made them highly 
controversial.  
Proponents of high-stakes testing assert that exit exams raise achievement by 
motivating students to work harder. They also argue that exit exams can act as a form of 
quality assurance for employers and colleges. However, critics argue that exit exams 
increase the dropout rate, narrow the curriculum, and withdraw attention from low-
performing students whose achievements fall far short of the established standards. Exit 
exams are currently implemented in 25 states and affect nearly 7 out of 10 public school 
students (Center on Education Policy, 2012). Given the extensive reach of high school 
exit exams, it is important to understand both the effects of exit exams and who is 
affected by them.  
The existing exit exam literature finds heterogeneous effects of exit exams. In 
particular, most studies find adverse effects on graduation rates, some positive effects on 
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employment and no effect on mean wages. In this paper, we make several contributions 
to the existing research. First, we separately analyze short-term and long-term effects of 
exit exams to test whether schools can successfully modify their curricula and teaching 
methods and minimize the adverse effects of exams in the long-run. Second, we test 
whether the decrease in graduation rates due to exit exams is offset by the receipt of a 
GED. Third, we examine whether affected students who drop out of high school exhaust 
their test-taking opportunities or quit shortly after failing the exam for the first time. Our 
final contribution is the analysis of wage effects at different parts of the wage 
distribution, rather than at the mean.  
To answer these questions, we use Current Population Surveys (CPS) and Census 
data and exploit the staggered timing of the implementation of exit exams across states. 
Simply comparing outcomes across states with and without exit exams can generate 
misleading predictions because a state’s decision to implement a high school exit exam 
can be endogenous to both fixed and time-varying characteristics of the state. To account 
for this, we include state and graduation year fixed effects as well as state-specific trends 
to control for time-invariant characteristics of states and characteristics that affect all 
states but vary across graduating cohorts. 
Overall, we find relatively modest effects of high school exit exams on the 
outcomes we analyze. In particular, we find that exams that assess skills taught below the 
high school level—called minimum competency exams—have very small negative 
effects on graduation rates. We find that more rigorous exams that test high school level 
content—called standards-based exams—are associated with a decline in the graduation 
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rate of between one-half to one percentage point. This decline is consistent with the 
average effect estimated in the previous literature. We also find that standards-based 
exams that are implemented after the phase-out of minimum competency exams have 
small and insignificant effects on graduation rates, while standards-based exams that 
were implemented from the ground up have a much larger negative effect on graduation. 
Our results also suggest that the decline in graduation rates associated with standards-
based exams is only partially offset by an increase in the number of students obtaining a 
GED. Our analysis of labor market outcomes offers mixed results: the CPS data suggests 
that exit exams are associated with higher employment rates, but these results disappear 
when Census data is used. We also do not find any significant change in the distribution 
of wages.    
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 examines the history of 
high-school exit exam movement and the current state of the exit exam reform. Section 3 
reviews previous studies of relevance. Section 4 introduces a detailed discussion of the 
theory behind the impact of exit exams on graduation rates and wages. Sections 5 and 6 
describe the CPS and Census datasets and our statistical approach. Section 7 presents the 
results on how specific reform policies have impacted various outcomes of interest. 
Finally, Section 8 concludes with a discussion of recommended policy measures. 
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1.2 Background 
 
1.2.1 History of the High School Exit Exam Movement 
 
The roots of the high school exit exam movement date back to the 1970’s. The initiators 
of this movement, mainly state policy-makers and grass-root reformers, were responding 
to the public’s concerns that too many young people were graduating from high school 
without a solid foundation of academic knowledge and skills. A solution to this problem 
was to allow states to set minimum quality standards for the state’s schools and graduate 
only those students whose academic knowledge met or exceeded these standards. The test 
used to assess whether high school students met the minimum quality standard became 
known as the high school exit exam. Figure 1 shows that states’ geographic location and 
the timing of exit exam implementation are related: early adopters were primarily border-
states and East Coast states, while later adopters included the West Coast and a handful 
of centrally located states.  
 Initially, proficiency cutoffs for high school exit exams were set low and exams 
tested basic academic skills typically taught between 6
th
 and 8
th
 grades. These minimum 
competency exams were prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, but in more recent years they 
have been replaced with more rigorous standards-based exams that focus on academic 
skills learned in 9
th
 grade or above. Both minimum competency and standards-based 
exams assess English and Math skills; some of the more recent standards-based exams 
also assess other subjects such as science or social studies and several states implemented 
end-of-course exams that test content taught in particular courses. Exams are first 
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administered sometime between the 9
th
 and 11
th
 grades, depending on the type of exam 
and the state.  
 The stakes attached to high school exit exams are high – students who do not pass 
all portions of the exit exam cannot graduate from high school. However, students do 
have multiple retesting opportunities, anywhere from two to eleven depending on the 
state. In some states students who fail every examination attempt can submit a petition to 
graduate; this petition can be based on course grades, letters of recommendation, school 
attendance and other academic factors (Center on Education Policy, 2002).   
      
1.2.2 Present Status of High School Exit Exam Policies 
 
As of 2012, 25 states had mandated the passing of exit exams for high school graduation. 
According to a report from the Center on Education Policy (CEP. 2012), 69% of U.S. 
high school students are currently enrolled in states with exit exams. For minority 
students, the reach of exit exams is even more widespread: 71% of African American 
students and 85% of Hispanic students are affected by exit exams (CEP, 2012).  
In recent years, there has also been a gradual shift away from minimum 
competency exams to the more difficult standards-based and end-of-course exams. In 
2002, 10 states were still administering minimum competency exams. As of 2012, all 
states with exit exams tested content taught through at least the 10th grade. 
The gaps in pass rates between white and minority students and between English 
speakers and limited English proficient (LEP) students are a major policy concern. 
During the 2010-2011 school year, the gap in pass rates on mathematics exams between 
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white and African American students ranged from 13 percentage points in Georgia to 36 
percentage points in New Jersey. Although smaller, the gap in reading still ranged from 8 
percentage points in Georgia to 19 percentage points in Washington (CEP, 2012).
1
 Gaps 
between white and Hispanic students were only somewhat smaller. The majority of states 
provide targeted funding and technical assistance in an attempt to close these 
achievement gaps, yet progress has been slow. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Motivation 
 
High school exit exams can influence the information conveyed by educational 
attainment and the incentives facing students and teachers. In this section we present the 
informal theory behind both the informational and incentives effects; a formal theoretical 
model is included in the appendix.  
For the moment, we abstract from concerns that high-stakes tests may narrow the 
academic curriculum. We build on the model of Betts and Costrell (2001), where high 
school exit exams raise the level of achievement required for high school graduation. 
This model generates two effects: sorting and incentives. To illustrate the sorting effect, 
assume that students and schools cannot adjust their behavior to ensure that students learn 
more when faced with exit exams. Also assume that employers are unable to distinguish 
quality among dropouts and among high school graduates: they only know that dropouts 
failed to attain the necessary standard and that graduates achieved at least that standard. 
                                                 
1
 The choice of passing cutoff can have a large effect on the “racial gap.” If the exam is sufficiently easy 
that all students pass or sufficiently hard than no students pass, the gap will be zero. Therefore, these gaps 
should be interpreted with caution. 
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When exit exams are introduced, some students who would have graduated without exit 
exams are shifted to the group of dropouts. Because their academic quality is better than 
the typical dropout, the addition of these students to the dropout group increases the 
average quality of the dropout group, but it also increases the average quality of the high 
school graduates group because the lowest-quality graduates have been removed. Since 
employers do not distinguish individual quality within each group, increased average 
quality leads to higher wages paid to both dropouts and high school graduates; however, 
individuals who are shifted from graduating to dropping out now receive lower wages. 
The sorting model therefore makes two predictions: graduation rates decrease and wages 
rise at the lower and upper ends of the wage distribution but fall at the part of the 
distribution associated with the shift in educational attainment. 
The assumption that students and schools cannot respond to the higher graduation 
standard by increasing their effort is too strong. Therefore Betts and Costrell also 
consider the incentive effects of testing. For now, assume that all skills are learned in 
school. We continue to assume that employers cannot distinguish quality among 
graduates and among dropouts; therefore, students do not benefit from acquiring skills 
beyond what is needed to pass the exit exam. In this case, introduction of exit exams has 
two effects: students must increase their effort to meet the higher graduation standard, but 
firms are also willing to pay a higher wage to students who learn more as a result of the 
higher standard. Students whose academic skills need little improvement put in the effort, 
pass the exit exam and receive higher wages; this contrasts with the predictions of the 
sorting model where such students would drop out and receive lower wages. However, 
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students who used to graduate but whose academic skills are far below the exam-passing 
threshold do drop out and get lower wages.  
In summary, both the sorting and the incentive effects predict a higher dropout 
rate, although the increase in the dropout rate under the incentives effect can be smaller 
because students who increase effort sufficiently can pass the exit exam. Both models 
also predict that wages of people who graduated with or without exams or did not 
graduate under both regimes should increase. The sorting model predicts that wages of 
people who cannot graduate because of exit exams should decrease. The incentives 
model predicts more complex wage effects for this group: students who require very 
large effort increases to pass the exam drop out and receive lower wages, but at-risk 
students who can increase effort and pass the exit exam receive higher wages.  
Betts and Costrell ignore the option of obtaining a GED. However, in deciding 
whether to graduate or to drop out of high school the student must also take into account 
the costs and benefits associated with acquiring alternative credentials. We assume, 
consistent with Cameron and Heckman (1993), that the GED represents a lower and 
therefore a more easily attainable standard than high school graduation, and thus, those 
who would graduate without exit exams but cannot meet the higher standard choose to 
take the GED. As a consequence, the total proportion of students having either a GED or 
high school diploma should remain unchanged; however, when examined separately, 
GED rates should rise and traditional diploma rates should fall. 
The Betts/Costrell model and the extension developed here leave out important 
considerations. The assumption that employers cannot observe individual quality is 
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unrealistic. If we allow for some observability of individual attributes, wages might not 
change as much as predicted by the models. In addition, Betts and Costrell treat skills 
taught in school as one-dimensional, and consider schools to be passive players. In 
practice, schools may respond to high-stakes testing by focusing on those skills in which 
students are tested and by devoting more resources to borderline high school graduates. 
Such “teaching to the test” methods could raise or lower wages and might have different 
effects for different groups. In addition, if extra attention is given to students who are just 
below the threshold of proficiency, it can divert attention from students who are even 
farther below this threshold. Therefore, borderline GED students can receive less 
attention as a result of the focus on borderline graduates, and this can reverse the 
prediction that the GED rate will rise by as much as the decline in the graduation rate.  
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
The existing exit exam literature provides inconsistent conclusions about the 
consequences of exit exams. Earlier literature often focused on reforms in a small number 
of states, most notably Texas, and on the effects of exit exams on test scores and, to a 
lesser extent, on graduation rates. Later literature broadened the analysis to include more 
states and more outcomes. 
 Three earlier studies analyze the increase in standardized test scores following the 
implementation of the Texas exit exam in 1991 and reached different conclusions. David 
Grissmer et al (2000) find that National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
scores in Texas increased faster than in the United States as a whole, suggesting that the 
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exam is a plausible source of this faster growth. In contrast, Stephen Klein et al (2000) 
report that NAEP scores rose only somewhat, not dramatically, faster in Texas than 
elsewhere. Finally, Walter Haney (2000) suggests that the Texas improvements can be 
attributed to more students dropping out, being held back, or being transferred to special 
education and excluded from the exam.  
Other studies focus on educational attainment and labor market outcomes rather 
than test scores. Amrein and Berliner (2002a) examine graduation, dropout, and GED 
enrollment rates for each of the sixteen states that implemented exit exams prior to 2000. 
They compare the changes in state trend lines with changes in the national trend and find 
that high school exit exams had a negative impact in eight states, a positive impact in four 
states, and an unclear impact in the four remaining states. However, by comparing each 
state to a national trend, the study confounds changes caused by the adoption of high-
stakes tests in other states. Our paper is closest in spirit to Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick 
(2006), Dee and Jacob (2006), and Warren, Grodsky, and Lee (2008). All three papers 
are based on a time-series/cross-section analysis of states.  
Warren, Jenkins and Kulick use the October Current Population Surveys to 
measure dropout rates among 16 to 19 year olds, the Common Core of Data to measure 
high school completion rates and data from the American Council on Education to 
measure the proportion of 16 to 19 year olds taking the GED. They estimate that more 
difficult exams, but not less difficult exams, reduce the high school completion rate and 
may increase the use of the GED. Moreover, they find larger effects in states with more 
ethnically and racially diverse populations and higher poverty rates. 
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Dee and Jacob use Census data to examine the effect of high school exit exams on 
school completion rates. Unlike Warren, Jenkins and Kulick, they can address ultimate 
graduation rates because they look at older respondents. However, because the data do 
not distinguish between recipients of a GED and traditional diplomas, they are forced to 
examine the effects on high school graduation including the GED. They find small 
adverse effects of more difficult exams and even smaller adverse effects of less difficult 
exams. They also find some evidence of positive employment effects for women, positive 
wage effects for blacks (for more difficult exams) and adverse wage effects for whites 
and Hispanics.  
Finally, Warren, Grodsky, and Lee use the U.S. Census 5% Public-Use Microdata 
Samples and the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Surveys to assess 
whether high school exit exams have widened the gap in labor force status between those 
with and without high school diplomas. They find no evidence that high school exit 
exams affect gaps in labor force status or that these outcomes vary across race.  
Our analysis differs from the above studies in the following ways. First, we look 
at older cohorts for whom we can observe completed schooling. Second, using the older 
cohorts and CPS data we separately analyze GED and high school diploma rates. Using 
theoretical predictions of the model, we then test whether a decrease in high school 
completion rates is offset by an increase in GED receipt. Third, we separately evaluate 
the short-term and long-term effects of exit exams on graduation and GED rates. Finally, 
rather than focusing on mean wages, we test the theoretical predictions of the model by 
analyzing different quantiles of the wage distribution.  
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1.5 Data  
 
We gathered information on the implementation date, type of exam and grade when first 
tested using archival research, direct communication with state departments of education 
and from John Robert Warren at the University of Michigan.
2
 These data allow us to 
distinguish between two types of high school exit exams: minimum competency (basic 
skills below the 9
th
 grade) and standards-based (aligned with high school level 
standards).
3
 We limit our sample period to cohorts who graduated between 1977 and 
2001. Although new exit exam policies were implemented after 2001, No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB) policies also applied after 2001 and graduation targets set under NCLB 
can confound the effects of exit exams.  
By the end of our sample period eighteen states had implemented a high school 
exit exam: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  The 33 remaining states (including the District 
of Columbia) either never introduced a high school exit exam or did so later.  
Although not the primary focus of our study, it is important to account for the use 
of accountability system because exit exams are often used as an element of a school and 
district accountability. There are two types of accountability systems: report card 
accountability that requires dissemination of school performance information to the 
public, and consequential accountability that goes a step further by attaching 
                                                 
2
 See http://www.hsee.umn.edu/. 
3
 We code two states that have end-of-course exams as having standards-based exams. 
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consequences (e.g., financial incentives, takeover threats) to school’s performance. The 
introduction of an accountability system can affect the graduation rates if, for example, 
underperforming schools at risk of sanctions make an effort to assist low-achieving 
students, and this extra attention may result in improved student performance and lead to 
higher rates of high school completion. We obtain data on the introduction of state 
accountability policies from Hanushek and Raymond’s (2004) accountability study.4 
We draw outcomes data from both the merged outgoing rotation groups (MORG) 
of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the US Census. Using CPS data offers an 
advantage over Census data – after 1998 CPS separately identifies individuals with a high 
school diploma versus a GED diploma while the Census combines these two categories 
into a single variable. The primary disadvantage of the CPS is that we must classify 
individuals by their state of residence at the time of the survey, not by where they lived 
when they were high school age. Another concern is that since the CPS excludes 
institutionalized population, it significantly under-represents high school dropouts (Sum 
and Harrington, 2003); therefore graduation rate estimates may exhibit an upward bias.
5
 
The Census data, on the other hand, identifies and surveys the institutionalized, and also 
provides information on the individual’s state of birth. Therefore, the Census data is a 
compliment to the CPS data, and we use both data sources in our analysis. In addition to 
                                                 
4
 For the 9 states which Hanushek and Raymond opted not to provide accountability information—Alaska, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota—we conducted 
additional research using state education department websites. We assumed that once an accountability 
system is introduced, it remains in place for the following years. 
5
 Exclusion of the non-civilian population likely produces a downward bias. 
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looking at high school completion and the GED, we also use data on earnings as well as 
demographic information.   
When exit exam policies are first introduced, they apply to a given graduating 
class: the state first begins withholding diplomas from students who reach 12
th
 grade in 
the year indicated as the implementation year. Therefore, we focus on people who turned 
18 (assumed high school graduation age) between 1977 and 2001 in the CPS and 1977 to 
1998 in the Census data.
6
 We refer to these yearly samples as “graduation cohorts”, even 
though some individuals in these cohorts might have dropped out of high school by the 
time they reached 18 years of age.  
Although we focus on individuals who turned 18, or “graduated”, between 1977 
and 2001, the outcomes data are drawn from the 1994 through 2011 CPS MORG files 
and from a 5 percent sample of the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. We use 1994 through 2011 
CPS data for several reasons. We begin in 1994 because it is the first year when we can 
eliminate immigrants who arrived after the age of sixteen and, hence, attended little or no 
high school in the United States. Furthermore, 1998 is the first year when we can 
distinguish between having a GED and a high school diploma. We focus on the 1990 and 
2000 Censuses because the time span of this sample is similar to that of the CPS sample. 
We restrict both samples to those individuals who are at least twenty (twenty-three for 
wage analysis) at the time of the survey to allow for individuals who receive their 
                                                 
6
 Assuming that all students graduate at 18 entails some measurement error and can create attenuation bias. 
We must limit the endpoint of Census data to 1998 because we focus on individuals who are 20 years or 
older in both the 1990 and 2000 Censuses.  
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diplomas when they are nineteen. The samples are restricted to those forty or younger in 
order to reduce the problem of educational attainment recall bias.
7
 
Because we begin observing outcomes in the 1990s, individuals who turned 18 
during the late seventies or early eighties will be older when we observe them in our 
sample. Assuming there is no recall bias about educational attainment, the effect of exit 
exams on graduation rate should not vary by age at observation. Employment and wage 
outcomes for older cohorts, however, do reflect long-term effects and can help us learn 
whether effects of exit exams are short-lived or whether they persist into mature 
adulthood.  
The resulting CPS dataset consists of 1,500,396 individuals whose predicted 
graduation occurred between 1977 and 2001 and whose schooling and employment 
outcomes are observed between 1994 and 2011. The dataset of individuals for whom we 
can distinguish between holding a traditional diploma or a GED consists of 1,222,191 
observations. The Census dataset consists of 5,811,769 individuals whose predicted 
graduation occurred between 1977 and 1998 and whose schooling and employment out 
comes are observed either in 1990 or 2000. 
Because exit exams apply uniformly to all students in a given state, within-state 
variation across students does not contribute to identification. Therefore, we aggregate 
the individual-level data on education outcomes so that our unit of analysis is a 
graduation cohort in a given state.
8
 The outcome variable turns into a proportion, e.g. the 
                                                 
7
 Our initial examination of the data revealed a strong tendency for within cohort educational attainment to 
grow after age 40, which we deemed implausible. 
8
 The individual-level observations are weighted using sampling weights provided by the CPS and the 
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proportion of individuals in year t in state s who received a high school diploma. We then 
use this proportion as the dependent variable in our analysis. The aggregated CPS dataset 
contains 1275 state-graduation year observations. The Census dataset has 1122 state-year 
observations, reflecting the fact that individuals who graduated between 1999 and 2001 
are excluded due to their age and the timing of data collection. 
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are presented in Table 1. High school 
diploma rates for the state-graduation year CPS sample are about 91 percent of which 
about 4 percent are GED.
9
 The Census high school diploma rates are lower, at 87 percent, 
which likely reflects the inclusion of institutionalized population. Roughly 22 percent of 
the state-graduation year observations have an exit exam, 15 percent of these are 
minimum competency exams and the remaining 7 percent are standards-based. 
Accountability systems are in place in 15 percent of the state-year sample. 
 
1.6 Empirical Strategy  
 
The contradictory conclusions presented in the literature review section suggest that 
identifying the effect of exit exams is difficult because exit exam policies can be 
endogenous to state characteristics that are correlated with outcomes of interest. For 
example, states with a greater share of low-performing students might be more likely to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Census 
9
 Our estimates of graduation rates are higher than the national averages. This is because we exclude 
immigrants who arrived after the age of 16 and we exclude the institutionalized population. Both of these 
groups are more likely to contain a higher share of high school dropouts. 
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pursue exit exam policies, but also more likely to have lower initial graduation rates 
relative to states that do not implement exit exams.  
Ideally, we would like to compare students who must pass the exit exam in order 
to graduate to a similar group of students in the same state and year who do not have to 
take the exam. However, this is difficult because once a state implements an exit exam, 
the exam requirements apply to everybody in that state. Instead, we use cohorts that 
graduated in the same state before the implementation of exit exams because they share 
the same state-specific characteristics as the post-exam cohorts.
10
 We introduce state and 
graduation cohort fixed effects to control for characteristics that are common across 
graduating cohorts within a state and characteristics that vary over graduation cohorts but 
are constant across all states (such as national economic or education policies).  
Using the state-graduation year dataset, we estimate the effects of high school exit 
exams on graduation/dropout, GED and non-employment rates and wage quantiles using 
the following equation: 
                                                                           (1) 
where     is the outcome variable of interest for state s and graduation cohort c;     is a 
set of dummy variables capturing whether state s had a minimum competency exam, a 
standards-based exam, report card or consequential accountability that applied to 
graduating cohort c;    is a state fixed effect and    is a time effect measuring the year of 
                                                 
10
 CPS data contains only the state of current residence; therefore, we must assume that the state where 
individuals are residing at the time of the survey is the state where they attended high school. Census data 
also contains the state of birth. We use this state-of-birth variable to perform a robustness check against the 
CPS results. 
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assumed graduation;     is a set of additional state-specific time-varying regressors 
(unemployment rate, average hourly wages, poverty rate) measured at the cohort’s 
graduation year. When we analyze short-term versus long-term effects of exit exams, we 
expand     to include three types of exams: minimum competency, standards-based not 
preceded by a minimum competency exam and standards-based implemented after a 
minimum competency phase-out. We then interact each of these three variables with 
years since exam implementation dummies.  
A potential problem with Equation 1 is that not only may policies be correlated 
with unobserved state effects, but policy changes may also reflect underlying state trends. 
This could lead to possible serial correlation in the state error terms and may severely 
bias the standard errors. First, we address this by clustering the standard errors in 
Equation 1 by state. In addition, we estimate: 
                                                                            (2)    
 
where we do not cluster standard errors by state but have added a state-specific time 
trend    .
11
 The state-specific time trend captures any systematic state-specific changes 
over the sample period. 
As described in the theory section, exit exams can affect not only the mean but the 
entire distribution of wages. Therefore, we begin our wage analysis by using individual-
level data and calculate the 10
th
, 30
th
, 50
th
, 70
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles of the log hourly 
                                                 
11 For this specification, we do not cluster errors by state. Experimentation has shown that such clustering 
does not have a consistent effect on the reported standard errors, and it is not clear that the problems that 
clustering is intended to address should remain in the presence of state-specific trends. 
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wage for each state-graduation year cohort. We estimate the percentiles in two ways: our 
preferred Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is described below, the quantile 
regressions method is described in the Appendix. We then examine the effects of testing 
on each of these percentiles separately. 
Wage quantiles for each graduation cohort in each state are calculated based on 
individual-level data. We use an OLS specification in which we regress log wages on age 
and time (year of survey) dummies:   
                                                                                                           (3)  
From this regression we obtain the residuals,     , which have been purged of the effects 
of age (experience) and survey year (economy-wide factors). For each state and 
graduation cohort, we then compute the quantiles of these residuals. The quantiles are 
computed simply by analyzing the distribution of the residuals for a given state and 
graduation cohort – no quantile regressions are used. The resulting dataset is a collection 
of wage quantiles for each state and graduation cohort; therefore, it has the same 
observational structure as the aggregated data used in previous regression specifications. 
We then use these state-cohort quantiles as a dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables are the same as in the graduation and non-employment analysis: exam and 
accountability dummies, state and time fixed effects, state-specific time trends and time-
varying state characteristics.  
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1.7 Results 
 
1.7.1 Education Outcomes 
 
Tables 2a and 2b are generated using CPS and Census data and show the effects of exit 
exams on high-school graduation rates when we do not distinguish between having a high 
school diploma and having a GED. These tables consist of three panels. In the upper 
panel, we differentiate only between the presence and absence of an exit exam and 
between the presence and absence of an accountability system. The middle panel 
distinguishes between minimum competency and standards-based exams and between 
report card and consequential accountability. Finally, the lower panel distinguishes 
between three types of exit exams: minimum competency, standards-based not preceded 
by minimum competency exams and standards-based that replaced minimum competency 
exams. 
The coefficients in the first column of both tables are uniformly negative, which 
suggests that both exit exams and accountability systems are associated with lower 
graduation/GED rates. However, this specification only controls for the presence or 
absence of exit exams or accountability and, as previously discussed, there is little reason 
to believe that the estimated effects are causal. Therefore, it is important to control for 
state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Indeed, once we control for 
these effects in columns 2 and 3, the estimated exam and accountability effects estimated 
using both CPS and Census data become smaller and some become statistically 
insignificant.  
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The coefficient on the exit exam dummy displayed in the last columns of the first 
panel is negative and significant when CPS data are used, and small and insignificant 
when Census data are used; however, it does not inform us about the impact of the 
different types of exams. Panel two of both Tables 2a and 2b displays the coefficients for 
minimum competency and standards-based exams separately. When CPS data are used, it 
suggests that more rigorous standards-based exams have a larger adverse effect on 
graduation rates—of about 0.8 percentage points—than the easier minimum competency 
exams. When Census data are used, the coefficient on standards-based exams is still 
larger than the minimum competency coefficient, but it is smaller in magnitude than the 
CPS coefficient and lacks statistical significance.  
The standards-based dummy in panel 2, however, is still a combination of two 
types of standards-based exams: those that replaced existing minimum competency 
exams and those that were not preceded by a minimum competency exam. It is possible 
that implementing a challenging exit exam from the ground up creates a stronger adverse 
effect than replacing a less rigorous exit exam with a more rigorous one. Indeed, as panel 
3 shows, standards-based exams that were implemented from scratch have a larger 
negative effect on graduation rates of about 1.3 percentage points when using CPS data 
and 1.2 percentage points when using Census data. Standards-based exams that were 
preceded by minimum competency exams show no adverse effect—an insignificant 
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decline in graduation rates of about 0.3 percentage points using CPS data and an 
insignificant increase of 0.4 percentage points using Census data.
12
  
The lack of an effect for standards-based exams implemented after minimum 
competency exams can have several explanations. First, the organizational structure of 
schools with existing minimum competency exams can help to significantly dampen the 
negative effects of standards-based exams. For example, development of new teaching 
methods and remedial courses may already be in place in schools that have administered 
minimum competency exams in the past, and this can help offset the negative effects of 
more rigorous exams. Another explanation for the differences in the effects of the two 
types of standards-based exams could be that states that choose to implement minimum 
competency exams first and later replace them with standards-based exams differ from 
other states along some unobserved characteristics. These characteristics might make the 
graduation rate in such states less responsive to the implementation of standards-based 
exams. 
We test the first hypothesis, that of remediation, using the following strategy. As 
remediation infrastructure of schools improves overtime, the effects of all exams—
including standards-based exams that were implemented from the ground up, and 
minimum competency exams—should diminish overtime. We test this by interacting the 
three types of exit exam dummies (minimum competency, and standards-based with or 
without prior minimum competency) with year-since-implementation dummies. We 
distinguish between one, two, three and four or more years since exit exam 
                                                 
12
 The two standards-based dummies are coded as mutually exclusive. 
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implementation. Results presented in Table 3 do not support our hypothesis that negative 
effects of exit exams on graduation rates diminish overtime. Although the CPS estimates 
show that effects of standards-based exams that were not preceded by minimum 
competency exams are reduced in year two, Census estimates show the opposite – large 
and significant negative effects that are sustained even four or more years after exam 
implementation. The discrepancies between these two results are likely due to the smaller 
sample size of the individual-level CPS data. Overall, these results do not support the 
hypothesis that schools are able to mitigate the negative effects of exit exams overtime.  
Table 4 displays the results of CPS data analysis that distinguishes between a 
GED rates and a high school diploma rates.
13
 The top left panel displays effects of testing 
and accountability on rates of GED obtainment, it does not distinguish between stand-
alone or pre- minimum competency standards-based exams. The first column presents 
estimates based on the state- and year- fixed effects specification. It reveals that 
minimum competency exams do not affect GED receipt, but that standards-based exams 
are associated with a higher rate of GED obtainment. However, the estimated 0.4 
percentage point increase in GEDs due to standards-based exams is insignificant at 
conventional levels and becomes even smaller with the inclusion of state-specific trends. 
The lower-left panel distinguishes between the two types of standards-based exams. It 
shows that standards-based exams that were not preceded by minimum competency 
exams are associated with a significant increase in GEDs of about 0.5 percentage points. 
                                                 
13
 Table 2 uses four more years of data than Table 3. Therefore, we do not expect the sum of the high 
school diploma and the GED effect to be exactly the same as that reported in Table 2. GED and high school 
diploma variables are not available in the Census. 
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In particular, given the diploma estimates presented in the right panel, GEDs offset about 
one-half of the decrease in graduation rates due to such standards-based exams. However, 
standards-based exams that were implemented after minimum competency exams are not 
associated with increases in GED rates.  
The results presented in Table 4 are partially consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical models. Theory predicts a decrease in high school graduation rates due to exit 
exams, and we do observe a decrease in traditional diploma rates due to standards-based 
exams that were not preceded by minimum competency exams. Theory also predicts that 
this decline will be fully offset by individuals obtaining a GED. However, the increase in 
the proportion of individuals obtaining a GED is of lower magnitude than the decline in 
graduation rates. As discussed in the theory section, there are a number of potential 
explanations, including changes in education (content or effort by schools) that work to 
the detriment of individuals on the margin of obtaining a GED.  
Given the wide gaps in pass rate between whites and minorities, it is important to 
examine the effects of exit exams on high school graduation rates among various 
population subgroups. Table 5 presents results by race and gender, using both CPS and 
Census data. The upper panel restricts the sample to males, while the lower panel 
presents results for females. The estimates show no effects for non-Hispanic whites, but 
are relatively large and negative, although not always significant, for blacks and 
Hispanics. Interestingly, effects of standards-based exams that are implemented from the 
ground up are negative, but when a standards-based exam is implemented after a 
minimum competency exam these negative effects are reversed (although the coefficients 
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are not statistically significant).
14
 Overall, there is some evidence that adverse effects of 
exams are larger for minorities, but that these effects may be dampened or even reversed 
if schools had implemented another type of exit exam in the past.  
In addition to the overall effect of exit exams on graduation, it is important to 
understand how exit exams affect the timing of the dropout decision for those students 
who are adversely affected by exams. For example, dropping out in earlier grades will 
lead to fewer years of schooling than dropping out near the end of high school, and fewer 
years of schooling have been linked with decreases in lifetime wealth and poorer health 
and employment outcomes (e.g. Oreopoulos, 2007).   
Because all students who take exit exams have multiple retesting opportunities, 
one might expect that students exhaust all of these opportunities before deciding to leave 
high school without a diploma. However, it is also possible that failing on the first 
attempt can be a signal that the student is unlikely to do well in the future. Therefore, 
students can become demotivated, stop trying and drop out shortly after not passing for 
the first time. In a 1989 study, Catterall interviewed over 700 students in four states with 
exit exams and found that students who failed the exam on their first attempt were more 
likely to express doubts about graduating high school.  
If students who initially fail the exam are discouraged from trying again, we 
should observe an increase in dropout rates in the earlier high school grades. If, on the 
other hand, students continue trying to pass until they exhaust their retaking 
                                                 
14
 When we aggregate individual-level gender and race data into state-graduation year cohorts, we drop 
state/graduation cohorts that are comprised of fewer than ten observations of a given race and gender. This 
could account for the lack of precise estimates. 
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opportunities, we should observe an increase in the 12
th
 grade dropout rate. To examine 
the timing of the drop out decision, we calculate dropout rates for grades 9 through 12 
using the CPS and Census variables indicating “highest grade completed”.15 It is 
important to understand whether individuals who report completing, say, the 9
th
 grade 
dropped out at the end of 9
th
 or at the beginning or middle of 10
th
 grade. Our investigation 
of the data suggests that students who “complete” a certain grade likely attended but not 
necessarily finished that grade.
16
 Therefore, we code a person as a 9
th
 grade dropout if 
they report having completed 9 grades.  
Table 6 displays estimates from four separate regressions. We find that minimum 
competency exams increase the probability of dropping out in 9
th 
and 10
th 
grades, 
although the estimates are not statistically significant, while standards-based exams 
increase the probability of dropping out in 10
th
 and 11
th 
grades. Given that the largest 
share (approximately 43 percent) of minimum competency exams in our sample are 
administered in the 9
th
 grade, this result suggests that exit exams do increase dropout 
rates soon after the initial failure. Results for standards-based exams suggest that more 
than half of the people who drop out due to exit exams do so in 10
th
 or 11
th
 grade.: A 
back-of-the-envelope calculation using the point estimates from Table 6 suggests that 
overall about 2/100
th
 of a year of schooling is lost due to exit exams.)  
                                                 
15
 We do not observe highest grade completed for respondents who received a GED. Therefore, dropout 
rates will be understated. 
16
 We looked at individuals who report completing 12
th
 grade but not receiving a HS diploma or GED in 
states with no exit exams. Individuals who complete their 12
th
 grade coursework and do not need to take 
exit exams should not be likely to drop out. However, we observe a rather sizeable dropout rates for this 
group. Therefore, it must be that students who report completing 12
th
 grade have not completed all of the 
requirements usually associated with completing 12
th
 grade. 
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Effects of high school exit exams can operate through various channels, the most 
obvious one being the failure to pass the exam. However, implementation of exit exam 
policies can also be accompanied by classroom and school-wide changes that can affect a 
student’s decision to graduate or to drop out. For example, narrowed curriculum and 
teaching to the test can discourage or bore students on the margin of dropping out; 
therefore, restructuring associated with exit exam policies can induce students to drop out 
even before they sit down to take the exam. On the other hand, if restructuring produces 
more rigorous instruction, graduation rates can increase even when not accompanied by a 
high-stakes test.  
To test this hypothesis, we use phase-in periods. Some states phased-in their exit 
exams in order to address unexpectedly high initial failure rates or to give teachers 
enough time to adjust their curricula to the new standards. Students who attended high 
school during the phase-in periods had to take the exit exams, but those who failed were 
not denied diplomas at the end of 12
th
 grade. This feature allows us to disentangle the 
effects of being held accountable for exit exam performance from the effects of simply 
being in an exit exam environment.  
To estimate whether exit exam environment has an effect on educational 
attainment, we regress graduation rates on a phase-in period dummy, state and cohort 
fixed effects, state-specific time trends and other state-year controls. The coefficients are 
estimated relative to state-cohorts that do not have an exit exam in place. Table 7 presents 
the estimates. The coefficients on the phase-in dummy are not consistent across the CPS 
and the Census samples, and Census coefficients are not significant. Although lack of 
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precision prevents us from concluding that exit exam environment can increase 
graduation rates, given the standard errors we can rule out a very large negative effect of 
exit exam environment on high school graduation. Lack of any effect is likely due to the 
fact that restructuring during phase-in periods can differ substantially from restructuring 
that occurs once exit exams are firmly in place.  
In all of the analysis above, we assign the state in which a person is currently 
residing as the state in which they attended high school. But this assumption will not hold 
for every individual in the sample, and can become particularly problematic if mobility is 
not random. Although neither the CPS nor the Census can directly identify the state in 
which the individual attended high school, the Census has an alternative variable—state 
in which the individual was born. We perform a robustness check by applying the 
analysis presented in Table 2 to a subset of individuals who, at the time of the Census 
survey, were residing in the same state in which they were born. This limits our sample to 
“non-movers” and should eliminate the effects, if any, of mobility. Results of this 
robustness check are presented in Table 14 of the Appendix and are analogous to the full-
sample CPS and Census results.   
An additional advantage of Census data is that, unlike CPS, the surveyed 
population includes institutionalized individuals.  Neal (2013) shows that 
institutionalization rates have increased over our sample period and, if high school 
dropouts are disproportionally represented in the institutionalized population, CPS 
estimates of an effect of exit exams on graduation rates can be biased. Given that our 
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Census and CPS estimates are similar in sign and magnitude, we conclude that the bias, if 
any exists, is not strong.  
An additional question that the Census can help answer is whether exit exams, by 
increasing the dropout rate, can lead to higher institutionalization rates. To test this 
hypothesis we compute the percentage of individuals in each graduation cohort who are 
institutionalized and regress it on exit exam dummies, state and year fixed effects and 
state time trends. Table 8 presents the estimates of this regression. We do not find any 
evidence that exit exams increase or decrease institutionalization rates.   
 
1.7.2 Labor Market Outcomes  
 
In the labor market analysis, we restrict our sample to those who are between the ages of 
23 and 40 at the time of the CPS and Census surveys. The first variable we examine is 
non-employment, defined as not working and not receiving a wage. We purge individual-
level non-employment status of the effects of age and time and then aggregate the 
individual data to state and graduation year level. The resulting aggregated non-
employment variable summarizes the state and graduation cohort’s relative probability of 
being non-employed over what would be predicted on the basis of age and year.  
 In Table 9, we show the effect of testing on non-employment. The upper panel 
examines the effects of testing as a whole, while the lower panel examines the effects of 
minimum competency vs. the two types of standards-based exams separately. When we 
control for state and year fixed effects, state trends and additional time-varying state 
characteristics, the results suggest a small but beneficial effect of exit exams on non-
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employment when CPS data are used, but no significant result when Census data are 
used.  
In Table 10, we also report the effect of exit exams on non-employment by sex 
and race. Our prior analysis of the effect of exit exams on graduation rates shows a larger 
adverse effect for minorities. Our non-employment analysis finds no significant or 
consistent effects using either the CPS or the Census sample. 
Table 11 shows the effect of exit exams on log wage quantiles. These quantiles 
are computed using the distribution of the log wage residuals that are purged of the 
effects of age and time. Overall, CPS results presented in Table 10 show neither large nor 
significant effects of high school exit exams on the distribution of wages. We performed 
a number of specification tests on this data, analyzing a finer partition of the lower part of 
the wage distribution, and again did not find any large or significant effects. The Census 
data does show significant effects on the 50
th
 and 70
th
 percentiles; however, although not 
shown in the table, these effects disappear if we replace time trend controls with clustered 
standard errors. Note that lack of an effect on the lower percentiles is consistent with the 
relatively small effect of exit exams on educational attainment, which is likely too modest 
to show up in the wage estimates. The lack of a wage effect also suggests that testing 
neither greatly improves nor greatly diminishes the quality of instruction. 
 
1.8 Conclusion  
 
Perhaps the most important conclusion of our analysis is that, for the most part, effects of 
exit exams are modest and many are not robust. We find no effect on graduation rates of 
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minimum competency exams or standard-based exams that were preceded by minimum 
competency exams. However, we do find that states with standards-based exams that 
were implemented from the ground-up experienced significant decreases in graduation 
rates. Our analyses suggests that these differences between the two types of standards-
based exams are likely attributable to unobserved characteristics of the implementing 
states rather than the state’s ability to adjust to exams overtime. 
We do not find consistent evidence of an effect of exit exams on non-employment 
or the distribution of wages. This lack of a wage effect contrasts the predictions of the 
theoretical models. The assumptions of the theoretical models are that, by implementing 
an exit exam, states have added a new quality signal for employers. However, in real life 
employers might take into account other observable information that makes this signal 
less valuable. Furthermore, it is not clear how much value employers place on the skills 
assessed by exit exams.  
Overall, the results presented in this paper cast exit exams in a more favorable 
light than the results of previous research. Although we do find that exit exams 
negatively affect high school graduation rates, subsequent analysis reveals that these 
estimates are primarily driven by states that implemented standards-based exams and 
have had no prior experience with other exit exams. Furthermore, even these adverse 
effects are partially offset by individuals obtaining a GED. More work remains on 
identifying the precise mechanisms through which adverse effects of standards-based 
exams differ across states. 
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1.9 Apendix: Theoretical Model 
 
This model assumes that educational standards signal to the firm the expected 
productivity of each worker. Students who graduate from high school have higher 
productivity than those who do not graduate, and firms can observe whether or not a 
student graduated.  
 Each student has an initial level of ability a, randomly distributed on the interval 
[   ] with  ( ) and  ( ) representing the probability density and cumulative 
distribution functions. The utility of student   depends on leisure    and lifetime earnings 
  . Each student maximizes utility: 
                                                                   (     )                                           (1)                           
subject to         . 
 Let   be the level of educational achievement. Level of achievement is 
determined by an educational production function  , which depends on both effort, 
(    ), and ability. Let   denote the value marginal product of one unit of educational 
achievement: 
                                                          (       ),                          (2) 
s.t.                   
                      
The state determines a minimum level of achievement required to graduate from high 
school, which is denoted by   .   
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 Firms do not directly observe worker’s productivity. Instead, firms observe 
whether each student graduated from high school, and use this signal to infer his expected 
productivity. Workers are paid their expected product conditional on whether they 
graduated or not. Let group 1 denote workers who have met or exceeded the minimum 
level of achievement    required for high school graduation, and let group 2 denote 
workers who failed to meet the standard. Because ability is not observable, wages will be 
constant within each group. Conditional on their achievement in high school, each worker 
maximizes his utility. 
 
RESULT 1: If some students choose to reach the minimum threshold required for 
graduation while others do not, then there exists an ability level    at which the worker is 
indifferent between groups 1 or 2, and workers will choose group 1 if     , and group 
2 if     . For workers who do not meet the standard,     . For     (   ), 
students get the following amount of education: 
                                                     {
 (    )                     
 
                             
      
     (    )               ( 
    ) 
                      (3) 
 Where    is defined by  (     )    .
17
 
 
                                                 
17
 For proof, see Betts (1998). 
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For wage analysis, assume that at least some students must exert positive effort to meet 
the new graduation standard. The expected wage is determined by expected productivity 
and can be calculated for each group (1/2) or workers:  
     (  |     )   ∫     ( )   
   
  
  ∫   (   ) ( )       (   (  )
 
   
    (4) 
and 
                             (  |     ) =   ∫  (   ) ( )        ( 
 )
  
 
               (5) 
 
When states increase the graduation requirement   , students who continue to graduate 
under this higher standard will be of higher quality. Equation 6 shows that their wages 
will rise: 
                           (
   
   
)|
    
 
 ( (   )  (  ))
   (  )
  
   
   
   
   
                 (6) 
The first term and 
   
   
 are positive, Betts (1998) shows that the sign of  
   
   
 is likely to 
be positive as well. Therefore, wages of workers in the first group will increase. 
 Wages of students of lower ability are determined by differentiating Equation (5) 
with respect to   : 
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For these workers, the sign of (      )⁄  determines the effect of higher standards on 
wages. If fewer students meet the graduation standard as standards increase, 
(      ) ⁄ is positive. Therefore, as  
  increases, the average ability of workers who 
belong to group 2 increases as well. This will result in a wage increase of all workers in 
group 2. 
 
RESULT 2: An increase in the graduation standard increases wages of workers with the 
highest and lowest ability. Workers who used to graduate but no longer do will 
experience a wage decrease. These marginal workers experience discrete wage drops, 
while workers in other groups experience marginal wage increases. 
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1.10 Appendix: Mobility Robustness Check  
 
In our primary analysis, we used the state in which the person is residing at the time of 
the survey as a proxy for the state in which the person attended high school. This 
approach can result in biased estimates if mobility is not random which respect to 
characteristics that determine the effects of exit exams on graduation. Although neither 
the CPS nor the Census has a variable that records state of residence during high school 
attendance or completion, the Census has an alternative variable that records state of 
residence at the time of birth. To eliminate the effects of mobility, we subset the Census 
sample to individuals who reside in their state of birth at the time of the survey. Although 
we still cannot ascertain that individuals did not move between birth and survey date and 
thus attended an out-of-state high school, it is plausible to assume that the majority of this 
subsample attended high school in their state of birth. Results of this analysis are 
presented in Tables 14.  
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1.11 Appendix: Analysis of Standard Errors 
 
The unit of observation in our primary analysis is a state-year graduation rate. This rate is 
computed by aggregating individual-level data on graduation status up to the state-year 
level. But the precision of the aggregated state-year graduation rate can vary from state to 
state because some states are bigger and have more individual-level observations than 
others. This can be particularly problematic in CPS data, because sample sizes are much 
smaller than the Census. 
 In this section of the Appendix, we explore whether this difference in precision 
has an effect on our regression results. To answer this question we use CPS data and run 
our primary analysis regression, regressing graduation rates on exam dummies, state and 
year fixed effects and state-specific time trends, and predict residuals    ̂:  
                           
We then compute sample size for each state-graduation year cell, and regress the square 
of the predicted residuals on the inverse of the state-year sample size:  
    ̂     (
 
   
)       
If the state’s sample size in a given graduation year has an effect on our baseline 
regressions, the coefficient   should be significant. Table 15a shows, the coefficient are 
indeed significant, and therefore state’s sample size can potentially be a problem. 
To further investigate whether sample size effects our estimates, we use CPS data 
and run weighted regressions of graduation rate in state s and graduation cohort c on 
38 
 
 
dummy variables for minimum competency and standards-based exams, state and year 
fixed effects, state-specific time trends and other state-specific controls. The weights in 
this regression are inversely proportional to the variance of an observation. Results are 
presented in Table 15b, and the estimates are in line with CPS estimates presented in 
Table 2. Therefore, differences in sample size across states and years do not appear to 
affect our results. 
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1.12 Appendix: Wage Estimates Using Quantile Regressions 
 
We use individual-level data and estimate quantile regressions separately for each state: 
                   (      )                                              
Equation (3) is estimated dropping individuals with no earned income. Note that the year 
effect on wages is allowed to differ by state and that each δ can be interpreted as a 
normalized wage for that cohort in that state.
18
 We chose to estimate quantiles separately 
for each state for computational reasons. Given the large size of the individual-level 
dataset, quantile regressions applied to the entire sample require a considerable amount of 
time to converge; estimating quantile regressions for each state separately significantly 
reduces sample size and, thus, estimation time.  However, if some states have 
predominantly younger or predominantly older populations, these state-specific quantile 
regression estimates could be biased.  
Table 16 shows the effect of the exit exam policies on the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th 
and 90th quantiles of the log wage distribution. The dataset used to estimate these results 
consists of log wage quantiles for each graduation-cohort/state combination. Overall, 
estimates are not statistically significant, and their magnitudes are small. We performed a 
number of specification checks, analyzing a finer partition of the lower part of the wage 
distribution, and again did not find any large or significant effects. 
  
                                                 
18
 The potential arbitrariness of the normalization is addressed by the state fixed effects in the regression of 
the normalized wage on testing and other variables. 
40 
 
 
1.13 Appendix: Falsification Test 
 
Although the finding of an adverse effect of exit exams on graduation rates are robust, a 
potential source of concern is that we might be capturing the effect of unobserved policy 
changes that are correlated with the introduction of exit exams. To test this hypothesis, 
we perform a falsification test in which we use a subgroup of individuals who would be 
subject to the same unobserved policies but who should not be affected by exit exams.  
The group that should not have been affected by high school exit exams are 
immigrants who arrived in the United States after the age of 16. This is because such 
immigrants either did not attend high school in the United States or spent very little time 
in an American high school. For all the immigrants in this sample we assign an expected 
graduation year—which is the year when such immigrants turn 18—and then create a 
state/graduation cohort dataset. We then perform the same regression analysis on this 
dataset as on the original sample. In particular, we compute graduation rates and non-
employment rates, and then use these as dependent variables in an ordinary least squares 
regression specification with exam and accountability dummies, state and year fixed 
effects, state-specific time trends and additional time-varying regressors. The results of 
these regressions are presented in Tables 17 and 18 and show that none of the dependent 
variables are significantly affected by exit exams. This supports our conclusion that our 
primary results are due to the effects of exit exams rather than omitted policy variables. 
We also analyze labor market outcomes for immigrants. Although the results are 
not shown, wage regressions using immigrants do not show any effects on non-
employment or on the wage distribution of each group.  
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Figure 1.1: Geography and Timing of Exit Exam Implementation 
 
Source: Robert Warren’s archives, http://www.hsee.umn.edu/
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
 
Outcome Variables: 
     
CPS:      
High school graduate 1275 0.87 0.04 0.75 0.97 
GED recipient 1275 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.10 
Diploma, high school or GED 1275 0.91 0.03 0.80 0.98 
Census:      
Diploma, high school or GED 1122 0.87 0.04 0.73 0.97 
 
Policy Variables: 
     
Exit exam implemented  1275 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Minimum competency  1275 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Standards-based  1275 0.07 0.26 0 1 
      
Accountability System 1275 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Consequential accountability 1275 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Report card accountability 1275 0.06 0.24 0 1 
      
Other Controls:      
Unemployment rate 1275 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.17 
Poverty rate 1122 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.27 
Average hourly wage 1173 10.18 2.79 4.75 18.64 
Notes: CPS data used in this analysis are obtained from the 1994-2011 CPS files (1998-2011 for 
GED), and are subset to individuals who turned 18 years old (expected year of high school graduation) 
between 1977 and 2001. Census data are obtained from the 1990 and 2000 US Census (5% sample) 
and are subset to individuals who graduated between 1977 and 1998, which results in fewer state-year 
observations than CPS data. Census variables do not separately distinguish between GED diploma and 
high school graduate status. Immigrants who arrived in the US after the age of 16 are excluded. Unit of 
observation is a graduation cohort c in state s. Poverty rate and average hourly wages are not available 
for the earlier graduation cohorts.                         
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Table 1.2a: Effects of Testing and Accountability on High School Graduation/GED 
Rates, 
1994-2011 CPS MORG Data 
 
HS Graduation/GED No Controls State FE, 
Year FE 
State-
Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam -0.016*** -0.005 -0.005** -0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Accountability -0.015*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
F-test 69.12 1.328 3.004 3.343 
Minimum competency -0.015*** -0.004 -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Standards-based -0.019*** -0.007* -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Consequential -0.014*** 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Report card -0.015*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
F-test  34.79 0.886 1.848 1.878 
Minimum competency 
(MC) 
-0.015*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Standards-based -0.014*** -0.006 -0.013*** -0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
-0.023*** -0.008* -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Consequential -0.014*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Report card -0.015*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
F-test  27.16 0.689 2.406 2.273 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 
years old between 1977 and 2001 and were interviewed by the CPS between 1994 and 2011. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of people in that state and graduation cohort who received a 
high school diploma or a GED. The first panel combines all exit exams into one explanatory 
variable; the second panel distinguishes between a minimum competency and standards-based 
exams; the third panel further divides standards-based exams by whether or not they were 
preceded by a minimum competency exam (standards-based and standards-based after MC are 
mutually exclusive). Robust standard errors are reported in column (2). Reported F-tests are for 
explanatory variables displayed in each panel. State-year controls include: poverty and 
unemployment rates, average hourly wages. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
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Table 1.2b: Effects of Testing and Accountability on High School Graduation/GED 
Rates, 1990 and 2000 US Census Data 
 
HS Graduation/GED No Controls State FE,  
Year FE 
State-
Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam -0.027*** -0.003 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Accountability -0.026*** 0.001 -0.004* -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
F-test 74.73 0.333 1.682 1.049 
Minimum competency -0.025*** -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Standards-based -0.032*** -0.009* -0.006* -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Consequential -0.028*** -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Report card -0.023*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
F-test  37.91 1.283 1.847 1.248 
Minimum competency 
(MC) 
-0.025*** -0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Standards-based -0.029*** -0.003 -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Standards-based after MC -0.036*** -0.015*** -0.000 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Consequential -0.028*** -0.001 -0.005* -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Report card -0.024*** 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
F-test  31.96 0.197 2.356 2.239 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 years 
old between 1977 and 1998 and were interviewed in the 1990 or the 2000 US Censuses. Both the 1990 
and the 2000 Census datasets are 5 percent samples. The dependent variable is the proportion of people 
in that state and graduation cohort who received a high school diploma or a GED. The first panel 
combines all exit exams into one explanatory variable; the second panel distinguishes between a 
minimum competency and standards-based exams; the third panel further divides standards-based exams 
by whether or not they were preceded by a minimum competency exam (standards-based and standards-
based after MC are mutually exclusive). Robust se are reported in column (2). Reported F-tests are for 
explanatory variables displayed in each panel. State-year controls include: poverty and unemployment 
rates, average hourly wages.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
45 
 
 
Table 1.3: Effects of Testing on High School Graduation/GED, by Year Since 
Implementation, 1994-2011 CPS and 1990, 2000 US Census Data 
 
Graduation rate CPS CPS Census Census 
     
MC, year 1 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
MC, year 2 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
MC, year 3 -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
MC, year 4+ -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SB, year 1 -0.018** -0.018** -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
SB, year 2 -0.011 -0.010 -0.014** -0.014* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
SB, year 3 -0.009 -0.008 -0.015** -0.016** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
SB, year 4+ -0.012 -0.012 -0.014** -0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
SB after MC, year 1 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
SB after MC, year 2 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
SB after MC, year 3 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
SB after MC, year 4+ -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Specific Controls No Yes No Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is the proportion of people in that state and graduation cohort who 
received a high school diploma or a GED. Explanatory variables are interactions of test dummies with 
year since implementation dummies. Standards-based and standards-based after MC dummies are 
mutually exclusive. All regressions control for accountability; State-specific controls include poverty and 
unemployment rates, average hourly wages. *significant at 10%;** significant at 5%;*** significant at 
1%.  
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Table 1.4: Effect of Testing on GED and High School Graduation, CPS Data 
Dependent Variable GED Diploma 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Minimum competency 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Standards-based 0.004 0.003 -0.009** -0.011** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Minimum competency 
(MC) 
-0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Standards-based 0.006** 0.005 -0.010** -0.015** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Standards-based after MC 0.001 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Time Trends No Yes No Yes 
Notes: GED and diploma rate analysis uses observations from 1998-2011 CPS data (therefore, they do 
not add up to Table 2 coefficients estimated using 1994-2011 data). GED and diploma rates are not 
available as separate variables in the US Census. The dependent variable is the proportion of people in 
that state and graduation cohort who received a GED or a traditional high school diploma. Standards-
based and standards-based after MC dummies are mutually exclusive. All regressions control for 
accountability. Standard errors reported in column (1) are clustered by state. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
47 
 
 
Table 1.5: Effect of Testing on High School Graduation, by Race,  
1994-2011 CPS and 1990, 2000 US Census Data 
 
 Non-Hispanic 
white 
Non-Hispanic black Hispanic 
Men: HS Diploma CPS Census CPS Census CPS Census 
Min. competency 0.003 -0.000 -0.011 -0.003 0.011 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.018) (0.012) (0.032) (0.018) 
Standards-based -0.006 -0.011 -0.049 -0.036 -0.077 -0.043 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.032) (0.025) (0.068) (0.038) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
0.013 0.015 0.023 0.040 0.105 0.060 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.046) (0.035) (0.088) (0.054) 
Observations 1275 1122 867 912 782 935 
Women: HS Diploma    
Min. competency -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.040 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.011) (0.033) (0.017) 
Standards-based -0.018** 0.000 -0.018 -0.023 -0.064 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.028) (0.023) (0.070) (0.037) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
0.021* -0.010 -0.011 0.008 0.092 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.008)  (0.041) (0.032) (0.090) (0.053) 
Observations 1274 1122 897 902 789 931 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state-graduation year cohort. States with fewer than 10 
individuals of a given race and gender were dropped from this analysis. The dependent variable is 
the proportion of people of a given gender and race in that state and graduation cohort who 
received a traditional high school diploma. All regressions control for accountability. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1.6: Effects of Testing on High School Dropout Rates, by Grade, 
1994-2011 CPS and 1990, 2000 US Census Data 
 
Dropout rates 9th grade 10th grade 11th grade 12th grade 
     
CPS     
Minimum competency  0.0017* 0.0024* 0.0004 -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Standards-based 0.0015 0.0001 0.0073** 0.0022 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
0.0003 0.0019 -0.0063 -0.0015 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Census     
Minimum competency -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Standards-based -0.001 0.004* 0.005* 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
-0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
State-specific time 
trends 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Comp. schooling laws Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column represents a regression. The dependent variables are the share of individuals in 
each state-graduation year cohort with the “highest grade completed” being 9th, 10th, 11th or 12th grade 
respectively. Individuals who report completing 12 grades do not have a high school diploma. All 
regressions control for accountability, state and year fixed effects, state-specific time trends and 
compulsory schooling laws. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 1.7: Effects of Exit Exam Externalities on Graduation Rate, 1994-2011 CPS and 
1990, 2000 US Census Data 
 
Graduation rate (1) (2) 
CPS   
Phase-in period 0.0070* 0.0043 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Census   
Phase-in period -0.0031 0.0001 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
   
State-specific time trends Yes Yes 
Other state-year controls No Yes 
Notes: During phase-in periods, schools administer exit exams but 
do not hold students accountable for failing. The estimate is 
obtained by regressing graduation rates on a phase-in period 
dummy, state and cohort fixed effects, state-specific time trends 
and other state-year controls. Regression estimates are relative to 
states without exit exams. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Table 1.8: Effects of Testing and Accountability on Institutionalization Rates  
 
HS Graduation/GED No Controls State FE,  
Year FE 
State-
Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Accountability 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-test 73.33 2.283 0.835 0.696 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 years 
old between 1977 and 1998 and were interviewed in the 1990 or the 2000 US Censuses. Both the 1990 
and the 2000 Census datasets are 5 percent samples. The dependent variable is the proportion of people 
in that state and graduation cohort who are institutionalized. Robust standard errors are reported in 
column (2). Reported F-tests are for explanatory variables displayed in each panel. State-year controls 
include: poverty and unemployment rates, average hourly wages.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 1.9: Effects of Testing on Non-Employment 
 
No Wage No Controls State FE, 
Year FE 
State-Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPS     
Exit exam 0.017*** 0.008* -0.006** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Minimum 
competency 
0.014*** 0.009* -0.005* -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Standards-based 0.026*** 0.009 -0.005 -0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Standards-based 
after MC 
0.014*** 0.009* -0.005* -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Census     
Exit exam 0.013*** 0.008*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Minimum 
competency 
0.008*** 0.007*** -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Standards-based 0.021*** 0.007 0.006 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Standards-based 
after MC 
0.012 0.006 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Notes: The dependent variable is nowage purged of the effects of age and time and aggregated to the 
state/graduation year cohort. An individual is flagged as having no wage if their wages are missing or 
zero (not employed). All regressions control for accountability. Standard errors reported in column 
(2) are clustered by state. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 1.10: Effects of Testing on Non-Employment, by Sex and Race 
 Non-Hispanic 
white 
Non-Hispanic 
black 
Hispanic 
Men: no wage CPS Census CPS Census CPS Census 
Min. competency -0.001 -0.001 0.032* -0.008 0.012 0.009 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) 
Standards-based -0.000 0.004 0.026 0.015 -0.015 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.035) (0.024) (0.051) (0.028) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.035 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.051) (0.036) (0.063) (0.041) 
Observations 1275 969 895 780 828 794 
Women: no wage    
Min. competency -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.019) (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) 
Standards-based -0.019 -0.003 0.014 0.009 -0.008 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.035) (0.025) (0.058) (0.037) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
0.016 -0.004 -0.002 -0.025 -0.014 -0.035 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.051) (0.037) (0.077) (0.054) 
Observations 1275 969 928 772 822 786 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state-graduation year cohort. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of people of a given gender and race in that state and graduation cohort who do not 
report having a wage. All regressions control for state and year fixed effects and state specific 
time trends, as well as accountability.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1 
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Table 1.11: Estimated Effects on the Distribution of Log Wage Residuals (Conditional On Working) 
 10-percentile 30-percentile 50-percentile 70-percentile 90-percentile 
 CPS Census CPS Census CPS Census CPS Census CPS Census 
Exit exam -0.006 0.005 -0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.007 0.013** -0.011 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Minimum competency -0.006 0.009 0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.012** -0.004 0.016** -0.006 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Standards-based -0.011 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) 
Standards-based after 
MC 
-0.001 0.038 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.030 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.018) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 0.012 
Notes: The dependent variable is the quantile of a residual obtained from an individual-level regression of wages on 
age and time dummies. The quantiles are computed for each state-graduation year cohort. All regressions control for 
state and year fixed effects, state-specific time trends and accountability. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% .
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Table 1.12: State and Year in which Specific Types of Exit Exams were First Introduced 
Year Introduced Minimum Competency Standards-Based End of Course 
1979 NY   
1980    
1981 VA NY  
1982 NC, MD, NV  NY 
1983 HI (1983-1999), TN, FL   
1984    
1985 AL, GA NJ  
1986    
1987 TX   
1988    
1989 MS   
1990 NM SC  
1991  LA  
1992  TX  
1993  FL  
1994 OH   
1995  GA  
1996    
1997    
1998    
1999  NV  
2000 MN NY, IN  
2001  AL  
Notes: Data on exit exams are obtained from John Robert Warren’s website (http://www.hsee.umn.edu/). 
The “year introduced” refers to the first graduating class affected by the new requirements. 
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Table 1.13: State and Year in which Specific Types of Accountability Systems were First 
Introduced 
 
 Consequential Report Card 
1987  ME 
1988  LA 
1989   
1990   
1991 IN IL, MD, MS 
1992   
1993 KY, WI  
1994   
1995 MD  
1996 GA NJ 
1997 CT, AL, MI, PA, TX AZ, DC 
1998 NV, NC, OK MO, NH, 
1999 CA, FL, VA OH 
2000 DE,RI, WV, LA, NY  
2001 AR, MA, OR, SD,TN, VT MN, WA, 
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Table 1.14: Effects of Testing and Accountability on High School Graduation/GED 
Rates, State of Birth Equals State of Residence, US Census 
 
HS Graduation/GED No Controls State FE,  
Year FE 
State-Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam -0.032*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Accountability -0.020*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
F-test 53.61 0.0210 0.565 0.177 
Minimum competency -0.033*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Standards-based -0.029*** -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Consequential -0.018** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Report card -0.023*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
F-test  26.94 0.404 0.480 0.140 
Minimum competency 
(MC) 
-0.033*** 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Standards-based -0.029*** -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Standards-based after MC -0.029*** -0.006 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Consequential -0.018** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Report card -0.023*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
F-test  24.95 0.163 0.671 0.588 
Notes: The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 years 
old between 1977 and 1998 and were interviewed in the 1990 or the 2000 US Censuses. Both the 1990 
and the 2000 Census datasets are 5 percent samples. The data is subset to individuals who are residing in 
the same state as their state of birth. The dependent variable is the proportion of people in that state and 
graduation cohort who received a high school diploma or a GED. The first panel combines all exit exams 
into one explanatory variable; the second panel distinguishes between a minimum competency and 
standards-based exams; the third panel further divides standards-based exams by whether or not they 
were preceded by a minimum competency exam (standards-based and standards-based after MC are 
mutually exclusive). Robust standard errors are reported in column (2). Reported F-tests are for 
explanatory variables displayed in each panel. State-year controls include: poverty and unemployment 
rates, average hourly wages.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 1.15a: State-Year Sample Size and Standard Errors 
 
Square of predicted residual (1) (2) 
   
1/(State-Year Sample Size) 0.0083    0.0053 
 (0.0008) (0.00086) 
   
State-specific time trends Yes Yes 
Other state-year controls No Yes 
Notes: Predicted residuals are obtained from the regression of graduation rate on exit exam dummies, 
state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends. The independent variable is the inverse of the 
state-year sample size in the CPS sample.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
Table 1.15b: Effects of Testing on Graduation, Weighted Regressions 
 
HS Graduation/GED (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MC -0.015*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SB -0.003 -0.007 -0.013*** -0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SB after MC -0.018*** -0.006* -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
cacc -0.016*** 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
racc -0.010*** -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Notes: The dependent variable is the proportion of people in that state and graduation cohort who 
received a high school diploma or a GED. Column (1) does not include any controls, column (2) 
controls for state and year FE and report robust standard errors. Column (3) controls for state-year time 
trends and column (4) adds state-specific controls. State-year controls include: poverty and 
unemployment rates, average hourly wages. Regression weights are inversely proportional to the 
variance of an observation. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1.16: Estimated Effects On the Log(hourly wage) Distribution (Conditional On Working) 
 10-percentile 30-percentile 50-percentile 70-percentile 90-percentile 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Exit exam 0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.017 -0.001 0.017 -0.007 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) 
Minimum 
competency 
0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.015 0.000 0.012 -0.007 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) 
Standards based 0.006 -0.008 0.009 -0.000 0.019 -0.004 0.028 0.003 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.025) (0.012) 
Notes: The data used to produce this table comes from the CPS MORG files. Each cell is a regression model with two specifications. The 
dependent variable is a wage quantile for state s and cohort c obtained from a quantile regression, unit of observation is a state-graduation 
year cohort. Model 1 includes state and year dummies. Model 2 also includes state-specific time trends. Standard errors reported in 
column (2) are clustered by state. All regressions control for accountability.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%
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Table 1.17: Effects of Testing on High School Graduation/GED Rates, Immigrants 
 No Controls State FE, 
Year FE 
State-Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam -0.060*** -0.014 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) 
Accountability -0.069*** -0.001 -0.013 -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) 
F-test  65.31 0.410 1.004 0.534 
Minimum 
competency 
-0.065*** -0.020 0.001 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) 
Standards based -0.045*** -0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) 
Consequential -0.097*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) 
Report card -0.034** 0.009 -0.020 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
F-test  36.24 0.686 0.631 0.353 
Notes: The analysis uses the CPS sample and is subset to immigrants who arrived in the US after the 
age of 16. The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 
years old between 1977 and 2001 and were interviewed by the CPS between 1994 and 2011. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of people in that state and graduation cohort who received a high 
school diploma or a GED. Robust standard errors are reported in column (2). State-year controls 
include: poverty and unemployment rates, average hourly wages. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1.18: Effects of Testing on Non-Employment, Immigrants 
 No Controls State FE, 
Year FE 
State-Specific 
Time Trends 
State-Year 
Controls  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exit exam 0.014** -0.014 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) 
Accountability 0.045*** -0.011 0.012 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
F-test  24.20 1.843 0.622 0.398 
Minimum 
competency 
0.0067 -0.0115 0.0060 0.0070 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
Standards based 0.0308*** -0.0211* -0.0083 -0.0067 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.025) 
Consequential 0.0433*** -0.0103 0.0093 0.0080 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Report card 0.0409*** -0.0111 0.0172 0.0136 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
F-test  13.19 1.048 0.507 0.320 
Notes: This analysis uses the CPS sample and consists of immigrants who arrived in the US after the 
age of 16. The unit of observation is a state graduation year cohort and includes cohorts that turned 18 
years old between 1977 and 2001 and were interviewed by the CPS between 1994 and 2011. The 
dependent variable is the proportion of individuals with no wage in each state/graduation year cohort. 
An individual is flagged as having no wage if their wages are missing or zero (not employed). Robust 
standard errors are reported in column (2). State-year controls include: poverty and unemployment 
rates, average hourly wages. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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2. Grade Enrollment Sorting under an Incentives-Based Class Size Reduction 
Program, with Daniele Paserman 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The effect of class size on student achievement is one of the most heated debates in the 
economics of education. However, a vast early empirical literature surveyed by Hanushek 
(1986) showed mostly inconclusive results, with coefficients often being insignificant, or 
going in the wrong direction. Despite the mixed nature of the empirical evidence, parents, 
teachers and school administrators maintain a strong and intuitive belief that smaller 
classes are conducive to more personalized instruction and better learning outcomes. It is 
therefore not surprising that programs aimed at reducing class size are still at the 
forefront of the policy agenda. 
The California Class Size Reduction (CSR) program is perhaps the most famous 
example of a large-scale program aimed at reducing class size. The program, 
implemented in 1996, was one of the largest and most expensive education reforms in the 
state’s history. An uncommon element of the CSR program was that participation of 
school districts was voluntary and annual incentive funding was provided to schools that 
chose to participate. Several studies have evaluated the effects of class-reduction under 
CSR on academic performance (CSR Research Consortium (2002); Jepsen and Rivkin 
(2009)). These studies highlighted that the program may embody some additional costs to 
students and society. For example, Jepsen and Rivkin (2002) showed that implementation 
of the CSR program was accompanied by the hiring of teachers with less experience and 
fewer credentials.  
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In this paper, we highlight another potential cost of the program, with potentially 
important distributional implications. In the presence of a strong financial incentive to 
cap class size at 20 students, a centralized school district will tend to reallocate students 
in a way that most schools will be eligible for the subsidy. If the ability of districts to 
reallocate students across schools depends on the district’s socioeconomic characteristics, 
or if the students who end up effectively being reallocated are different from the ones that 
remain in their catchment-area school, the class size reduction program may have 
unexpected distributional consequences. 
Using data from all California public schools for grades K-3 between 2003 and 
2007, we document a number of intriguing facts about school enrollment. First, the 
distribution of grade enrollment across all schools presents remarkably large spikes at 
multiples of 20. This is strong evidence that schools effectively cap their enrollment in 
such a way that they are eligible for the CSR subsidy. The bunching of enrollment at 
multiples of 20 is particularly pronounced in school districts with more than one school. 
There is some mild evidence of bunching in districts with a single school, but statistical 
tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the density of enrollment is continuous throughout 
the whole distribution. This suggests that decisions about enrollment are probably made 
centrally at the district level to ensure that most schools are eligible for the subsidy. 
Second, schools with enrollment just to the left of the relevant multiple-of-20 
threshold, (i.e., schools in which all classes can potentially have less than 20 students and 
be eligible for the CSR subsidy) exhibit significantly better socio-demographic 
characteristics than those located to the right of the threshold: they have a lower 
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percentage of minority students and students eligible for free lunch and they are located 
in areas with lower unemployment rates, higher female labor force participation rates, 
and higher household income. Thus, the CSR subsidy appears to affect mostly students 
from relatively higher socioeconomic background. 
Third, test scores in schools to the left of the threshold are significantly higher, 
even after controlling for all demographic characteristics and district fixed effects. 
Therefore, schools to the left of the threshold are significantly better not only in terms of 
their observable characteristics, but also in terms of the unobservable determinants of 
student achievement. 
Finally, we also show that the distribution of class size within schools does not 
drop discontinuously at the multiple-of-20 thresholds. Therefore, it is not possible to 
implement a regression discontinuity estimation strategy (à la Angrist and Lavy, 1999) to 
study the effect of class size on test scores. 
 
2.2 California’s Class Size Reduction Program 
 
The California Class Size Reduction program was implemented through California’s 
Senate Bill 177 in July of 1996. This measure aimed to reduce class sizes in grades K-3 
from a maximum of 33 students per teacher to a maximum of 20 students per teacher. All 
elementary and unified school districts and district-funded charter schools were eligible 
to apply, but application and program participation was voluntary
19
. School districts had 
to submit an application and adhere to all the requirements of the program in order to 
                                                 
19
 Locally funded charter schools could apply on their own behalf or through their authorizing entity. 
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receive annual CSR funding. Although the district decided whether or not to apply to the 
program, implementation of the CSR program was done by school site. A district could 
implement the program in all or in just a few schools and could decide whether all K-3 
grades or only a subset of eligible grades would undergo class-size reductions. According 
to CSR rules, class-size reduction priority had to be first given to grades one and two, 
followed by kindergarten and third grade. 
 Participating school districts had to report the number of students in every class to 
the state, and pupil counts had to begin on the first day of school and continue through 
April 15. Although the goal of the program was to limit the student teacher ratios to 20:1 
for the entire school year, enrollment in a class was allowed to exceed 20 students for a 
limited amount of time. Therefore, as long as the yearly average of class enrollment 
counts was less than 20.44, schools received $650 per student for each student in a 
reduced-size classroom
20
. All funding was lost if the yearly average class-size exceeded 
20.44. Schools that added extra classrooms to accommodate smaller class sizes were also 
given a one-time allocation of $25,000 per added classroom to improve existing facilities 
or to acquire portable classrooms (EdSource, 2013).  
In 2004, the original CSR legislation was modified with Senate Bill 311. This bill 
was meant to provide relief to schools whose class-sizes exceeded the maximum yearly 
average of 20.44 by a modest amount by increasing the yearly average cap to 21.9 
students per year. The bill also outlined a sliding scale indicating what percent of total 
funding can be claimed by schools whose yearly class-size average was between 20.44 
                                                 
20
 This per-student subsidy was subsequently increased to reflect cost of living adjustments, amounting to 
$1,071 by 2012. 
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and 21.9 students per class. In particular, classes greater than 20.5 but less than 21 would 
lose 20 percent of the funding, classes between 21 and 21.5 would lose 40 percent and 
classes between 21.5 and 21.9 would lose 80 percent. If the yearly average number of 
students in a class exceeded 21.9, the class would lose 100 percent of CSR funding 
(CDE, 2013)  
Some sources estimate that the CSR program was the largest state education 
reform in US history. In 2000, the program costs were estimated to be about $1.5 billion 
per year and in that year it affected over 1.8 million students (CSR Research Consortium, 
2002). By 2009, after program expansion and annual cost-of-living adjustments, the total 
allocation for the program was 1.83 billion (EdSource, 2013).  
Although school districts were not required to participate in the class-size 
reduction program, the financial incentives of the CSR program and its popularity among 
parents and teachers resulted in widespread participation. By the 1997-1998 academic 
year 84 percent of California’s K-3 students were in reduced-size classes. By the next 
academic year, 98.5 percent of all eligible districts were participating in the program, and 
92 percent of K-3 students were in reduced-size classes. As of 2000-2001 academic year, 
98 percent of all first and second grade students and 95 percent of kindergarten and third 
grade students were participating in the program (CSR Research Consortium, 2002). 
During the 2007-2008 school year, 869 out of 883 eligible school districts participated in 
the program and 240 charter schools were offering reduced classes (EdSource, 2013). 
Schools that did not reduce class size in all K-3 grades had to prioritize class-size 
reduction. In particular, if only one grade was reduced, the grade level had to be first 
65 
 
 
grade; if two grade levels were reduced, the reduction had to apply to first and second 
grades. Grades K and 3 received the lowest priority (CDE, 2013).  
 
2.3 Literature  
 
Academic literature on the effect of class-size on student’s academic performance 
contains an extensive list of studies. Studies that use cross-sectional, non-experimental 
data find no effect of smaller classes on student achievement (Hanushek (1995, 2003)). 
This finding of zero effect has been attributed to the bias generated by the endogenous 
sorting of students into schools and classes (Krueger (2003)). However, experimental 
studies (Tennessee STAR experiment) and studies that use a quasi-experimental 
regression-discontinuity (RD) design (Angrist and Lavy (1999)) use exogenous variation 
in class-size to purge the results of selection bias and find positive and significant effect 
of smaller class size on student achievement. More recently, Chetty et al. (2011) find that 
students in small classes in the Tennessee STAR experiment also experience better long-
term outcomes. A large and positive effect of smaller class size is also found in 
Fredriksson et al. (forthcoming), who exploit a maximum class-size rule in Sweden and 
find that children exposed to small classes at ages 10-13 have higher completed education 
and higher wages at ages 27-42. 
Studies that focus specifically on the California CSR program show no clear 
benefit of smaller classes on academic achievement. For example, using year-to-year 
differences in class size Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) show that increases in test scores due 
to reduced class sizes in California were offset by the deterioration in average teacher 
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quality. Funkhouser (2009) isolates the effects of curriculum changes and finds a very 
small effect of reduced sized kindergarten classes on test performance in second grade. 
Most similar to our study is the work by Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009).They  
develop a model of a private school system in which schools have a class size cap and 
higher-income households sort into higher-quality schools. The key prediction of the 
model is that schools at the class-size cap adjust prices (or enrollments) to avoid adding 
an additional classroom, generating a discontinuity in the relationship between 
enrollment and household characteristics. The predictions of the model are borne out in 
data from Chile's liberalized education market. The contribution of our paper is to show 
that a similar sorting also arises in the California public school system, even though 
schools cannot directly adjust prices to control enrollment. 
 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In our analysis we use staffing, grade enrollment and test score data files. The datasets 
are extracted from the California Department of Education (CDE) website. None of these 
data contain individual-level information. Instead, variables are aggregated to either the 
class-grade-year-school level in the staffing data, or to grade-year-school level as in the 
grade enrollment and test score data. The staffing data contain information about the staff 
member assigned to a particular class as well as male and female enrollments in that class 
and the grade level of the majority of students in the class. It also contains the grade span 
(highest and lowest grades taught) at the school to which the staff member is assigned. 
The school-level grade enrollment dataset contains grade enrollment at each school for 
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each grade and year, as well as school-level yearly grade enrollment totals for males, 
females, blacks and Hispanics. The test score dataset contains test scores from California 
Standards Tests (CST) in English and Mathematics that are available beginning in second 
grade and are aggregated at the grade level. All three datasets contain county, school 
district and school ID variables that are consistent across all years and datasets. We use 
school and district IDs to identify schools that belong to single versus multiple school 
districts.  
 Although staffing data files are available for the years between 1997 and 2007, 
test score data is available from 2001 through 2007 and has variables defined consistently 
starting only in 2003. Therefore, we use a 2003 through 2007 subset of all three datasets 
in our analysis. During this time period we subset the staffing and grade enrollment data 
to students enrolled in kindergarten through third grade and test score data to students in 
second and third grades to capture the K-3 student population affected by the class-size 
reduction program.  
In addition to staffing, grade enrollment and test score data, a separate CDE data 
file contains school-level variables such as the school’s zip code, the school’s charter 
status and the percentage of students who receive free or reduced price meals at a given 
school in a given year. We merge these variables onto our primary dataset using year and 
the unique id assigned to each school.  
To control for demographic characteristics, we merge zip code level demographic 
characteristics from the 2000 Census by school’s zip code. We focus on the following 
demographic characteristics: median household income, unemployment rate, female labor 
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force participation, percent of residents with a college degree, percent of renter-occupied 
households, and percent of urban households. Finally, we merge variables that are 
available in the staffing or the test score data but not in the grade enrollment data onto the 
grade enrollment dataset using year and school ID. 
We use school-level grade enrollment data in most of our analysis because the 
grade enrollment variable is original to this dataset and is reported for each grade and 
year at the school level. For comparison, we also construct a grade enrollment variable in 
each of the two other data sets: for the staffing data, we construct grade enrollment by 
simply adding up all the male and female class enrollment figures in a given school, 
grade and year; for the test score data, we take the reported STAR (Standardized Testing 
and Reporting) enrollment in each grade, school and year. The three measures are highly 
correlated (the correlation between enrollment in the original enrollment data set and 
enrollment in the class size and test score data sets are 0.946 and 0.947, respectively), but 
there are also some important discrepancies: less than 25% of the class-size based 
enrollment, and less than 10% of the test-score based enrollment matches exactly with the 
school-level data, and the absolute value of the difference has a median of 6 and 8. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics computed using school enrollment data. Panel 
1 reports percentiles of grade enrollment, number of classes per grade and number of 
schools per district for all schools (the latter two variables are merged onto school 
enrollment data from staffing data). Panels 2 and 3 report grade enrollment and number 
of classes per grade for single versus multiple school districts. Grade enrollment is larger 
in multiple school districts, and multiple school districts have more classes per grade 
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across all percentile levels relative to single school districts. Overall, the number of 
schools per district has a wide distribution, with 148 schools per district at the 90
th
 
percentile  
 
2.5 Data analysis 
 
Grade enrollment directly influences the ease or difficulty with which a district can create 
CSR-compliant classes within a school. For example, if a school enrolls 42 students in a 
given grade the district has three different options. Option one is to create three classes, 
each with fewer than 20 students. Option two entails creating two classes with 20 and 22 
students each. Finally, if  two students can be absorbed into another class or another 
school, option three is to create two classes of exactly 20 students each. Option two is 
least desirable because the district is only subsidized for the class of 20, not of 22 
students. If the district chooses to create three classes of less than 20, as in option one, it 
would have to open an additional classroom, hire and pay for an additional teacher and, 
potentially, find extra classroom space. Option three, creating two classes of 20 students 
each, generates the largest CSR subsidy while minimizing CSR-related expenses.  
Therefore, the net subsidy a district receives for complying with CSR depends 
both on the number of students in reduced-size classes and on schools’ grade enrollment. 
In particular, grade enrollments of slightly less than or equal to a multiple of 20 produce 
classes with close to or exactly 20 students in each course and generate the largest CSR 
subsidy net of operating expenses. Therefore, districts have a strong incentive to target 
grade enrollment to these levels.  
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In Figures 1a through 1c we examine the frequency distribution of grade 
enrollment using school enrollment, staffing and test score data, pooling together all 
grades and years. If grade enrollment was random we would expect to see a relatively 
smooth distribution of enrollment across schools. In particular, the number of schools 
whose enrollment is slightly below or is equal to a multiple of 20 should be roughly the 
same as the number of schools whose enrollment slightly exceeds a multiple of 20. 
However, Figures 1a-1c demonstrate unambiguously that grade enrollment is not random. 
In all three figures, grade enrollment peaks at multiples of 20 where schools that are 
chosen by their district to comply with CSR receive the maximum subsidy payment per 
class. Substantially fewer schools are to the right of that threshold, at grade enrollments 
that slightly exceed multiples of 20
21
.  
One can formally test for a discontinuity in the enrollment density using a 
modified version of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2009). Specifically, we created a new 
variable equal to the difference between actual enrollment and the nearest multiple of 20 
(by construction, this variable always takes on values between -9 and +10), and then 
performed the McCrary test on this created variable. Table 2 presents the results of this 
test for grade enrollment in all schools, grade enrollment in single school districts, district 
enrollment for all districts and district enrollment for small districts. The null hypothesis 
of no change at the threshold is rejected for all schools, schools in single school districts 
and for district enrollments in small districts. We were not able to reject the null when all 
                                                 
21
 The distribution of grade enrollment looks similar both before and after 2004, when the 20.44 yearly 
student average was increased to 21.9. Grade enrollments in the post-2004 period also exhibit peaks at 
multiples of twenty, despite the fact that post-2004 schools can have 21 students per class throughout the 
year and still receive the CSR subsidy.    
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districts, big and small, are pooled together. 
The peaks in Figures 1a-1c are more prominent when school’s grade enrollment 
levels are relatively low and are considerably less prominent for schools with larger grade 
enrollments. The peaks are also more prominent in the staffing data; however, the 
staffing grade enrollment variable is not collected by the CDE but is instead constructed 
by adding up reported class enrollments, which themselves exhibit a sharp discontinuity 
at 20 students. We suspect that these constructed data do not accurately reflect the true 
grade enrollment levels. The test score grade enrollment variable is collected by the CDE 
and should therefore be more accurate, but it is not clear if enrollments reported in the 
test score data reflect the number of students tested on a given day in a given grade or the 
overall grade enrollment. Therefore, in our subsequent analysis we will use the grade 
enrollment variable that is reported in the school enrollment dataset.  
The enrollment pattern illustrated in Figure 1 suggests that many districts actively 
manipulate school’s grade enrollments and limit enrollments to multiples of 20 to 
maximize their CSR subsidy. This raises the question of what happens to students 
assigned to a school whose true enrollment exceeded a multiple of 20 before it was 
modified. Although our data cannot offer a formal answer to this question, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that districts use a variety of approaches to achieve desired grade 
enrollment levels.  
Some school districts have designated areas called buffer zones. Students who 
live in the buffer zones are not assigned to a particular school; instead, given the set of 
schools available to students in a given buffer zone the district can decide which school a 
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student will attend. Other school districts use a district choice model where the district 
decides which school, within a pre-defined area, the student attends. Some districts have 
strict school boundaries that permit students who live within that boundary to go the 
assigned school. But such districts can still limit grade enrollments by setting school-
specific enrollment limits and admitting students on a first-come first-serve basis or 
through a lottery. Students who wish to enroll in their home school after the desired grade 
enrollment levels have been reached can be assigned to the nearest school that has 
classroom space and is accessible by district transportation, a practice known as 
overloading. For example, the following overloading definition and procedures are posted 
on the website of Freemont Unified School District: “An overload student is any student 
enrolled after the class size ratio has been reached. … Overloaded students remain in a 
non-home school until a space becomes available in the student’s home school”. 
Although Freemont Unified currently overloads elementary school students only when a 
30:1 student-teacher ratio is reached, the same strategy can be used by districts that do 
not wish their student-teacher ratios to exceed 20:1 and aim to limit school’s grade 
enrollments accordingly. 
The ease with which a district can assign a student to a non-home school should 
depend on the density of schools in the district and the availability of classroom space at 
those schools. Single school districts should therefore not overload students because there 
are no receiving schools within the district boundaries. Figure 2a shows that the 
distribution of grade enrollment for single school districts does not display the pattern of 
peaks that was evident in Figures 1a-1c. The distribution for non-single school districts is 
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shown in Figure 2b, where the spikes at multiples of 20 once again become prominent. 
As shown in Table 2, the McCrary test for equality of the grade distribution around the 
threshold in single school districts is soundly rejected. 
If students are redirected within their own district, we should observe the non-
random enrollment pattern at the school level but not at the district level. Figure 3 
displays district-level enrollment and does not show the clear pattern of peaks as in 
Figures 1a-1c or Figure 2b. When all districts are pooled together the McCrary test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the enrollment density is continuous at multiples of 
20, but the test is rejected when small districts with grade enrollments of fewer than 200 
students are analyzed. 
Because only K-3 students are eligible for CSR funding, we should not observe 
peaks at multiples of 20 for enrollments in grades 4 and 5. Figures 4a and 4b shows that 
enrollments in grades 4 and 5 indeed do not display prominent peaks, further supporting 
the hypothesis that districts are able to successfully adjust enrollments in earlier grades. 
Lack of peaks also suggests that reduced-size classes are not maintained once funding is 
terminated. 
In addition to the overall incentive funding guidelines, the CSR program has other 
institutional details. In 2004, Senate Bill 311 modified the penalty incurred by schools 
whose class sizes exceeded the yearly average maximum of 20.44 students per teacher. 
The new maximum was set at a yearly 21.9 student average. Because the penalties were 
relaxed, we would expect to see more schools with grade enrollments to the right of the 
multiples of 20 after 2004. Moreover, class-size reduction had to be prioritized to grades 
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one and two, followed by kindergarten and third grade. Therefore, if districts chose to 
reduce class size in a subset of grades K through 3 enrollments in first and second grades 
should be more likely to be on the left of a multiple of 20. Finally, grade enrollment size 
can have an effect on the decision of whether or not to limit grade enrollment. On the one 
hand, schools with large grade enrollments face capacity constraints and can find it more 
difficult to create additional classrooms; on the other hand, it is less costly for large 
schools to create CSR-compliant classes for grade enrollments to the right of the 
threshold because the fixed costs of an extra class represent a smaller percent of the total 
CSR funding.  
Table 3 explores the effects of these institutional details on the probability that 
grade enrollment is to the left of the threshold. The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether or not grade enrollment is to the left of a multiple of 20. Column one 
estimates are based on a dummy that flags grade enrollments that are exactly equal to the 
threshold while estimates in columns two through five are based on dummies that flag all 
enrollments within one to four units to the left of the threshold.   
The probability estimates in Table 3 suggest that after 2006 grade enrollments are 
significantly less likely to be to the left of the threshold relative to 2003. This is 
consistent with changes in the CSR rules that were put in place in 2004 increasing the 
maximum yearly class-size average from 20.44 to 21.9 and relaxing the penalties for 
classes that exceeded the 21.9 class-size average.  
Coefficients on the grade dummies in Table 3 are negative. This suggests that 
grades 1 through 3 were less likely to below the threshold than kindergarten. This is not 
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consistent with the CSR rules that give class-reduction priority to grades one and two, but 
it may reflect the natural inclination of schools to have smaller classes in kindergarten, 
regardless of the incentives embodied in the CSR program. 
Threshold dummies in Table 3 capture the approximate size of grade enrollment. 
The threshold dummy estimates show that larger schools are less likely to be below a 
multiple of 20, and this supports the capacity constraint hypothesis. 
In subsequent analysis, we explore the relationship between grade enrollment and 
students’ demographic characteristics and test scores. A summary of demographic 
variables is presented in Table 4. Percent free lunch, percent Hispanic, percent black and 
percent female variables were obtained from the school characteristics or grade 
enrollment data files, while median household income, unemployment rate, female labor 
force participation rate, percent college educated, percent renter households and percent 
urban are zip-code level Census variables that were merged with grade enrollment data 
using schools’ zip codes.  
Figures 5a-5c plot demographic characteristics against grade enrollment. These 
graphs offer a visual test for whether or not school in which grade enrollments are limited 
to multiples of 20 differ from other schools along any of the above demographic 
dimensions. Trends in Figures 5a-5c suggest that percent free lunch, percent Hispanic, 
median household income, and female labor force participation are not randomly 
distributed across grade enrollment levels. These variables exhibit either peaks or troughs 
at grade enrollments equal to a multiple of 20. Other variables do not display prominent 
patterns in the graphs but regression analysis is needed to determine whether these 
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demographic characteristics significantly differ to the left and to the right of the 
threshold.  
Table 5 formally tests for differences in demographic characteristics at the 
threshold. Specifically, we create enrollment windows of size k=1,2,…5 around the 
multiple-of-20 thresholds, and test whether each of the demographic characteristics 
differs to the left and right of the threshold. Each row in Table 5 displays coefficients 
from separate regressions of the relevant demographic characteristic on a dummy 
indicating whether or not grade enrollment is to the left or equal to 20n. Column 1 
subsets the data to include only observations where grade enrollment observations that 
are equal to 20n or 20n+1. Column 2 extends the window to two units above and below 
the threshold, column 3 to three units above and below, etc. Columns 6 and 7 hold the 
window at five units and control for district fixed effects and the interaction of district 
and year fixed effects.  
Regression coefficients tell us how the demographic characteristics change just 
above and below the threshold, varying the window around the threshold. Virtually all 
demographic characteristics of the school vary significantly depending on whether the 
corresponding grade enrollment is above or below the threshold. For example, 
households that belong to schools whose grade enrollment is to the left of the threshold 
are located in zip codes with median household incomes that are $1,263-$2,036 higher 
than households whose school’s grade enrollment is to the right. Other demographic 
variables also suggest that schools to the left of the threshold are less disadvantaged, have 
higher percentage of white students, and are located in areas with lower unemployment 
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and higher female labor force participation rates. When district and year fixed effects are 
included, coefficients on most regressions remain significant although income, 
unemployment rate and female labor force participation rate coefficients become 
insignificant. Overall, this suggests that even within the same district the decision to cap 
enrollments at multiples of 20 is not random with respect to demographic characteristics. 
Table 5 presents another interesting finding: the coefficient on the female dummy 
is significant across specifications, even when district and year fixed effects are included. 
Because girls tend to do perform better in school, one explanation is that the district 
allocates girls to particular types of schools to boost the school’s test scores. Another 
explanation is that parents of girls are better able to ensure that girls go to particular types 
of schools than parents of boys, and these decisions might be driven either by the quality 
of the school or the distance from home to the assigned school.  
We next move to the analysis of test scores as a function of grade enrollment. If 
classes are split when enrollment exceeds the nearest multiple of 20, and class size has a 
negative effect on achievement, we would expect to see that classes to the right of the 
threshold have higher test scores, as in Angrist and Lavy, 1999. On the other hand, the 
previous analysis highlighted that schools with enrollment to the left of the threshold 
exhibit significantly better indicators of socioeconomic status, suggesting that perhaps 
schools on the left of the threshold will have better test scores. 
Figure 6 plots test scores against grade enrollment. Test scores in both grades 2 
and 3 and in both English and Math display peak exactly at grade enrollment multiples of 
20, and not to the right of this threshold. These results are consistent with the results from 
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Table 5 that schools at or slightly below this threshold are wealthier and are likely located 
in well-performing school districts.  
Table 6 formally tests for differences in standardized test scores at the threshold. 
As in Table 5, each panel of Table 6 displays a coefficient from a separate regression of 
test scores in a given subject and grade on a dummy indicating whether or not enrollment 
is to the left or equal to 20n.. Column 1 subsets the test score data to grade enrollment 
observations that are equal to 20n or 20n+1, column 2 extends the window to two units 
above and below the threshold, etc. Columns 6-8 successively add demographic controls, 
district fixed effects and interaction of district and year fixed effects. As expected, test 
scores are significantly higher to the left of 20n, and remain so even after the inclusion of 
demographic controls and district and year fixed effects. There are two possible 
interpretations for this finding: a) it is possible that schools to the left of the threshold are 
better not only on observed socio-demographic characteristics, but also on the 
unobserved determinants of school achievement; b) schools that do not split classes when 
they reach the threshold end up having somewhat larger classes, and this has a negative 
effect on achievement. 
In order to maintain a class-size of 20 students or less, districts should be creating 
new classes in CSR-compliant schools as their enrollment levels grow. For example, 
when enrollment in a given grade is 20, 40 or 60, classes attain the maximum size of 20 
students for each of these enrollment cohorts. But when grade enrollment reaches 21, 41 
or 61, districts should divide these enrollment cohorts into classes that, on average, have 
10.5, 13.6 or 15.25 students respectively. More precisely, we should observe that class-
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size adheres to the following class-size function (see Angrist and Lavy, 2009): 
      
   
   (     )   
    
where     enrollment in school s and grade g,     denotes the class-size assigned to 
school s, grade g and class c, and    ( ) is the largest integer less than or equal to a 
Figure 7 plots the average class-size from the staffing dataset and hypothetical 
class-size generated by      against grade enrollment. Although average class-size does 
overlap with predicted class size just to the left of the multiple-of-20 thresholds, classes 
do not appear to be split when enrollment is just above the threshold. 
Figure 8 investigates the relationship between class size and grade enrollment 
further by graphing the distribution of class-size for two groups of schools. The first 
group (dotted line), includes schools with grade enrollments that are within five units to 
the left of a multiple of 20, while the second group (solid line) includes schools that are 
within five units to the right. Figure 8 shows that schools with grade enrollments to the 
left of the threshold have almost no classes that exceed 20 and have a sizeable share of 
classes that are smaller than 20. On the other hand, schools with grade enrollments to the 
right of a multiple of 20 have more classes that exceed 20 but fewer smaller classes. This, 
again, suggest that districts choose not split their enrollment cohorts into smaller CSR-
compliant classes in schools whose grade enrollment slightly exceeds 20n because such 
classes generate relatively little CSR funding. Schools whose grade enrollment is slightly 
below 20n can generate classes with close to or exactly 20 students per class so that 
districts can get the maximum amount of CSR subsidy.  
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Table 7 tabulates the percentage of students in each grade who are enrolled in 
classes of a given size. Overall, the vast majority of students across all K-3 grades are 
enrolled in classes of 20 or fewer, which is in-line with other studies (CSR Research 
Consortium, 2002). Kindergarteners and third graders have a higher fraction of students 
in classes that are larger than 20. This is consistent with CSR class-size reduction 
priorities for grades 1 and 2 but inconsistent with grade dummy estimates presented in 
Table 3. However, percentages reported in Table 7 are calculated using class enrollments 
reported in the staffing data files while Table 3 uses enrollments from the grade 
enrollment dataset. Therefore, these estimates might not be directly comparable. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we document a non-random pattern of grade enrollment that is induced by 
the financial incentive structure of the CSR program. Schools with relatively low 
enrollment levels have more prominent peaks at multiples of 20 because school districts 
where such small schools are located have more incentives to limit enrollment. First, if 
enrollment exceeds a multiple of 20 at a small school the district would have to create 
classrooms with substantially fewer than 20 students. Second, although the marginal cost 
associated with creating an extra classroom is the same at both small and large schools, 
this marginal cost represents a much larger share of the total CSR payment for a small 
school. Finally, in addition to class-specific expenses, a small school likely has few 
support staff and might have to hire additional support staff to accommodate an 
additional classroom. Large schools, on the other hand, might have many support staff 
81 
 
 
and can stretch an extra classroom across its existing personnel. 
 We also find that at enrollment levels where class-size exogenously drops, 
socioeconomic status also drops, and this discontinuity violates the assumptions needed 
for the implementation of an RD design to study the effect of class size on test scores. 
Therefore, academic researchers who plan to use public school data from other states or 
countries where incentive funding is used to reduce class size should be aware of this 
mechanism’s implications.  
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Figure 2.1a: Distribution of Grade Enrollment 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
Figure 2.1b: Distribution of Grade Enrollment 
Staffing Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
Figure 2.1c: Distribution of Grade Enrollment 
Test Score Enrollment Data, Grades 2-3, 2003-2007 
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Figure 2.2a: Distribution of Grade Enrollment in Single-School Districts 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
 
Figure 2.2b: Distribution of Grade Enrollment in Non-Single-School Districts 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of District Enrollment, 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2000-2007  
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Figure 2.4a: Distribution of Grade Enrollment in Grade 4, 
School Enrollment Data, 2000-2007  
 
Figure 2.4b: Distribution of Grade Enrollment in Grade 5, 
School Enrollment Data, 2000-2007  
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Figure 2.5a: Demographic Characteristics and Grade Enrollment 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
 
Figure 2.5b: Demographic Characteristics and Grade Enrollment 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
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Figure 2.5c: Demographic Characteristics and Grade Enrollment 
School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Test Scores and Grade Enrollment 
Test Score Data, Grades 2-3, 2003-2007 
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Figure 2.7: Average Class Size, by Enrollment 
Class Size and Enrollment Data, Grades 0-3, 2003-2007 
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Figure 2.8: Class Enrollment Densities, by Grade Enrollment Categories 
Grade Enrollment: [20n-5, 20n] vs. [20n+1, 20n+5] 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 School Enrollment Data Grades K-3, 2000-2007 
 
percentile 10 25 50 75 90 No Obs. 
       
All Schools       
Grade enrollment  37 60 82 110 139 108,237 
# classes per grade 2 3 4 5 7 103,047 
# schools per dist. 4 8 17 41 148 103,047 
       
Single School Districts       
Grade enrollment  17 23 37 62 101 4,343 
# classes per grade 1 1 2 3 5 4,343 
       
Multiple School Districts       
Grade enrollment  46 63 85 113 140 98,704 
# classes per grade 2 3 4 6 7 98,704 
       
Notes: Calculations are based on school-level grade enrollment data that includes grades K-3, years 
2003-2007.  The number of classes per grade variable has been merged from the staffing data files using 
year and school id. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: McCrary Density Tests 
Bandwidth h 1 2 3 4 5 
      
All Schools -0.536*** -0.627*** -0.588*** -0.565*** -0.537*** 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 
      
Single School Districts -0.242 -0.282*** -0.231*** -0.208*** -0.194*** 
 (0.152) (0.107) (0.087) (0.076) (0.068) 
      
District enrollment, all -0.078 -0.089 -0.067 -0.053 -0.053 
 (0.086) (0.061) (0.049) (0.043) (0.038) 
      
District enrollment, small  -0.147 -0.175** -0.144** -0.127** -0.112** 
   districts (0.114) (0.080) (0.065) (0.057) (0.051) 
      
Notes: Entries in the table represent the values of the McCrary density test statistic, for different  
bandwidth choices. The test statistic tests the null hypothesis that the density is continuous around the 
threshold, and is calculated as the difference in the estimated log density between the two sides of the 
threshold. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.3: Institutional Determinants of Grade Enrollment 
 School Enrollment Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
Pr(<=20n) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 20n [20n-1, 20n] [20n-2, 20n] [20n-3, 20n] [20n-4, 20n] 
      
2004 -0.003 -0.014 -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
2005 -0.007 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
2006 -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.021*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
2007 -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.026*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
      
grade 1 -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
grade 2 -0.046*** -0.064*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
grade 3 -0.044*** -0.050*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
      
threshold=40 0.032* 0.018 0.006 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
threshold=60 0.048*** 0.030** 0.018* 0.014 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
threshold=80 0.028* 0.028** 0.022** 0.021** 0.023*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
threshold=100 -0.012 0.012 0.019* 0.024** 0.027*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
threshold=120 0.011 0.017 0.020* 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
threshold=140 -0.052** -0.018 0.002 0.009 0.023** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) 
threshold=160 -0.086*** -0.044** -0.012 0.009 0.027** 
 (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 
threshold=180 -0.070* -0.061** -0.052** -0.025 -0.014 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) 
threshold=200 -0.163*** -0.148*** -0.120*** -0.084*** -0.064*** 
 (0.047) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) 
      
Observations 17,479 30,270 41,335 51,716 61,202 
Notes: The regression sample excludes observations with grade enrollments of fewer than 16 students. The 
omitted threshold category is 20. Omitted grade is kindergarten. Column 1 indicates  the probability of 
having an enrollment that is exactly equal to a multiple of 20, column 2 – enrollment that within one unit 
to the left of the threshold, column 3 – enrollment that is within two units to the left, etc. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Demographic Characteristics 
 School Enrollment and Census Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
 Mean SD Min Max Num Obs. 
      
% free lunch 54.97 30.35 0 100 102,424 
% Hispanic 46.24 30.72 0 100 108,237 
% black 7.26 11.83 0 100 108,237 
% female 48.46 6.76 0 96.97 108,237 
Median HH inc 48,657 18,637 0 196,298 91,766 
Unempl. rate 7.87 4.68 0 53.65 91,826 
Female LFPR 54.78 7.05 19.11 100 91,826 
% college 14.86 9.09 0 45.51 91,826 
% renters 38.54 15.73 0.68 94.68 91,766 
% urban 91.96 19.96 0 100 91,826 
      
Notes: All demographic variables, except percent free lunch which is provided for each school by CDE, 
are zip-code level variables that are merged by school zip code from the 2000 US Census files. 
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Table 2.5: RD Regressions of Demographic Characteristics on Enrollment 
 School Enrollment and Census Data, Grades K-3, 2003-2007 
 
Dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Window  
width = 1  
Window  
width = 2 
Window  
width = 3 
Window  
width = 4 
Window  
width = 5 
Window  
width = 5, 
District FE 
Window  
width = 5, 
District*yr 
FE 
        
% free lunch -6.88*** -5.22*** -4.52*** -4.15*** -3.96*** -1.44*** -1.57*** 
 (0.50) (0.37) (0.31) (0.28) (0.25) (0.17) (0.18) 
 {16777} {29063} {39682} {49600} {58608} {58608} {58608} 
        
% Hispanic -3.68*** -2.79*** -2.77*** -2.73*** -2.89*** -1.07*** -1.12*** 
 (0.41) (0.30) (0.25) (0.22) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) 
 {22983} {41156} {57470} {73217} {87932} {87932} {87932} 
        
% black -0.31* -0.13 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
 {22983} {41156} {57470} {73217} {87932} {87932} {87932} 
        
% female 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
 {22983} {41156} {57470} {73217} {87932} {87932} {87932} 
        
med HH inc 2036.45*** 1807.99*
** 
1415.30**
* 
1316.17*
**** 
1263.17**
* 
104.72 107.67 
 (326.60) (242.15) (204.49) (180.26) (164.50) (93.88) (98.52) 
 {14640} {25529} {35059} {43959} {52114} {52114} {52114} 
        
% renters -0.61** -0.53*** -0.32* -0.25 -0.29** 0.19** 0.21** 
 (0.27) (0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) 
 {14634} {25527} {35057} {43957} {52111} {52111} {52111} 
        
% urban 1.15*** 1.01*** 0.79*** 0.53*** 0.06 -0.15** -0.15** 
 (0.30) (0.23) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) 
 {14651} {25550} {35088} {43993} {52152} {52152} {52152} 
        
% college 0.80*** 0.72*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
 {14651} {25550} {35088} {43993} {52152} {52152} {52152} 
        
unempl. rate -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.18*** 0.02 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
 {14651} {25550} {35088} {43993} {52152} {52152} {52152} 
        
female 
LFPR 
0.62*** 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.47*** 0.06 0.05 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
 {14651} {25550} {35088} {43993} {52152} {52152} {52152} 
        
Notes: Each section is a regression of the dependent variable on enrollment <=20 dummy, grade, year and 
enrollment FE. The displayed coefficient is for <=20dummy. Column 1 subsets to grade enrollment 
observations equal to 20n or20n+1, column 2 – to a two unit window around the 20n threshold, etc.
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Table 2.6: RD Regressions of Test Scores on <=20n Dummy 
Test Score Data, Grades 2-3, 2003-2007 
 
Dependent var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Window  
width = 1 
Window  
width = 2 
Window  
width = 3 
Window  
width = 4 
Window  
width = 5 
Window  
width = 5, 
Controls 
Window  
width = 5, 
Controls + 
District 
FE 
Window  
width = 5, 
Controls + 
District*yr 
FE 
         
Grade 2 
English 
 
0.25*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 {3570} {6726} {9500} {12022} {14503} {12296} {12296} {12296} 
         
Grade 2 Math 
 
0.26*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 {3569} {6725} {9500} {12022} {14503} {12297} {12297} {12297} 
         
Grade 3 
English 
 
0.20*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 {3765} {6920} {9764} {12299} {14725} {12468} {12468} {12468} 
         
Grade 3 Math 
 
0.22*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 {3765} {6919} {9764} {12299} {14725} {12467} {12467} {12467} 
         
Notes: Each section within a panel represents a separate regression of test scores on enrollment <=20 dummy, grade, year and 
enrollment fixed effects. In addition, columns 6-8 control for demographic characteristics. The displayed coefficient is for the <=20  
dummy. Column 1 subsets the sample to grade enrollment observations equal to 20n and 20n+1, column 2 subsets to grade 
enrollment within a 2 unit window of the 20n threshold, column 3 – enrollment within a three units window, etc. 
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Table 2.7: Class Size Distribution, Grades K-3, 2000-2007 
 
Class-size Kindergarten 1
st
 Grade 2
nd
 Grade 3
rd
 Grade 
 % % % % 
     
<=15 9.09 2.96 4.11 3.22 
16 2.6 2.13 2.53 2.43 
17 4.33 4.87 5.64 5.40 
18 8.17 10.73 11.80 11.59 
19 15.55 21.6 22.48 21.17 
20 43.31 50.22 47.19 45.88 
21 4.54 4.82 3.89 3.87 
22 1.5 1.22 0.89 0.98 
23 0.82 0.33 0.29 0.35 
24 0.63 0.18 0.13 0.24 
>=25 9.47 0.94 1.05 4.87 
     
Observations 185,296 188,073 187,914 186,496 
Notes: Table reports percentages of students enrolled in a class of a given size in a given grade.  
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3. Effect of Rank-Based University Admissions on Academic Performance: Evidence 
from the Texas Top 10 Percent Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Minority population in the United States has grown steadily over the recent decades. The 
latest Census estimates reveal that for the first time in the history of the United States 
most of the nation’s babies are members of minority groups (United States Census 
Bureau Press Release, 2012). Yet despite the growing presence of minorities in the 
overall US population, minorities continue to be underrepresented on college campuses 
(American Council on Education, 2010), and this persistent underrepresentation has led 
to concerns that the country’s future labor supply will be endowed with low levels of 
human capital. In an effort to increase college enrollment rates of minorities, in 1998 the 
state of Texas implemented the Top 10 Percent Law. According to this policy, an 
applicant to any state university in Texas would be automatically admitted if this student 
graduated in the top decile of her high school class. The new law was expected to 
increase campus diversity because socio-economic and racial characteristics of Texas 
high schools vary considerably; therefore, admitting students from the top decile of each 
of the state’s high schools could translate the state-wide socioeconomic and racial 
diversity into similar diversity on college campuses. 
The Top 10 Percent law generated a fair amount of criticism. Critics of the law 
argue that students who are able to enroll as a result of rank-based admissions might not 
be ready for the academic challenges of a college curriculum. This is because policy 
beneficiaries tend to come from socioeconomically disadvantaged and resource-poor high 
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schools and the educational background of such students, even if high-achieving within 
their school, tends to be less rigorous than the background of traditional enrollees. Such 
academic mismatch can cause college performance of rank-admitted enrollees to lag 
substantially behind that of traditionally admitted students. 
In this paper, I investigate the critics’ claim by comparing college academic 
performance of students who graduated in the top decile of their class and were admitted 
under the rank-based regime relative to the performance of students who graduated in the 
top decile of their class but were admitted before the rank-based regime was 
implemented. The students in my sample attended University of Texas at Austin (UT 
Austin), a well-known flagship university that experienced a major increase in the shares 
of top decile enrollees as a results of the Top 10 Percent Law. I use a difference-in-
differences approach with “never-eligible” students as controls to separate out changes in 
students’ academic performance from grade inflation trends. My baseline estimates 
suggest that mean college GPA of top decile students declined after the law relative to the 
pre-law college GPA of the top decile group. However, these initial estimates may be 
overstated because of two confounding factors: changes in the characteristics of ineligible 
students overtime and the combination of grade inflation and the GPA ceiling effect. I 
correct for the non-constant characteristics of the second decile group using propensity 
score matching methods. I address the GPA ceiling effect by using quantile regressions. 
Although the corrected estimates are smaller in magnitude, they continue to suggest that 
some post-law top decile students were performing worse than their pre-law peers. 
However, the decline in the mean post-law college GPA of the top decile group is not 
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very large and it is mostly driven by post-law students who drop out in subsequent 
semesters. 
 
3.2 The Top 10 Percent Plan 
 
Historically, universities have attempted to increase their share of minorities by using 
race and ethnicity as a factor in admissions, a policy known as affirmative action. 
However, in 1996 a federal appeals court banned the use of race-sensitive admission 
practices at all public postsecondary institutions and the Texas Top 10 Percent Plan was 
implemented as an alternative. Texas legislature voted on the Top 10 Percent policy in 
1997 and universities began using high school class rank in admissions in the summer of 
1998. The intent of this new admissions practice was to increase racial diversity, and the 
policy indeed visibly altered application and enrollment patterns of the targeted Black 
and Hispanic student populations. Figure 1 displays enrollment rates of Blacks and 
Hispanics at UT Austin before and after the law; the year of the law’s implementation is 
marked with a grey vertical bar. This figure demonstrates that enrollment rates of 
minorities increased after the law, with an especially pronounced increase in Hispanic 
enrollment. Because most of the pre-law period was dominated by the affirmative action 
regime, a substantial increase in minority enrollment post-law suggests that rank-based 
admissions have been even more effective than affirmative action at increasing diversity. 
Figure 2 subdivides UT Austin’s enrollment rates by high school class rank. As 
expected, the law substantially increased the share of enrollees who graduated in the top 
decile of their high school class; however, this increase coincided with a decline in the 
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shares of ineligible students, those who graduated in the second and below deciles. The 
cause of these diverging enrollment trends of top decile and ineligible students was the 
growing demand for top decile admission seats at UT Austin. In particular, because of its 
flagship status UT Austin became saturated with students eligible for automatic 
admission and, due to the limited number of admission slots, the top decile group began 
displacing students who graduated at or below the second decile. The university reacted 
to this increased representation of top decile students by increasing the size of its 
freshman class between 2000 and 2002. However, in 2003 this class size expansion was 
rescinded and high demand for top decile seats eroded the shares of ineligible students 
while also intensifying competition for admission among this group (Tienda and Nui, 
2010). As a result, ineligible students admitted under the Top 10 Percent regime were 
more likely to be academically selected compared with the same pre-law cohort. This will 
present a challenge for my estimation strategy, and I will use propensity score matching 
to correct for post-law selection of ineligible students. 
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
To conduct my analysis, I will be using data collected by the Texas Higher Education 
Opportunity Project (THEOP); this database contains administrative records from seven 
public and two private Texas universities from 1992 to 2005. During this period, Texas 
universities employed three different systems of admissions. The period from 1993 to 
1996 marks the direct use of race in admissions (affirmative action). In 1997, after the 
ban on affirmative action, Texas employed no system of racial integration. From 1998 to 
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2003, the Texas Top 10 Percent Plan was in effect. 
Although THEOP’s administrative records are available for nine universities, I 
only analyze students enrolled at University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin) (in the 
future, I will also analyze data from Texas A&M). The reasons for narrowing my focus 
are as follows. First, data from UT Austin and Texas A&M span several years before and 
after the implementation of the law, while data from other state universities are more 
limited and data from the two private universities span only the years after the law. 
Second, difficulties in adjusting to college, if they exist, should be more pronounced at 
these flagship institutions relative to other lower-ranked state universities in Texas. 
Two types of administrative records are available for each university. Application 
records provide information on all applicants and contain data on applicant’s SAT and 
ACT scores, high school class rank, gender, race and a measure of high school’s 
economic status. For students who matriculated, transcript records include semester GPA, 
cumulative GPA, chosen major and graduation date (if graduated within the time frame 
of the dataset). I will be using semester GPA in college as a measure of student’s 
academic success. 
Table 1 displays pre- and post- law summary statistics for first-semester UT 
Austin students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class; the pre-
law period spans the years 1994 to 1997, while the post-law period covers the years 1998 
to 2003. Only students who graduated in the top decile of a Texas high school are 
analyzed, and pre- and post-law comparisons are made for the following variables: 
gender, race, economic status, SAT/ACT scores and first semester college GPA. Column 
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one displays pre-law characteristics, when top decile students were not yet eligible for 
rank-based admissions, while column two describes characteristics of top decile students 
after the rank-based admissions rule went into effect. 
Gender composition of the top decile group does not vary pre- and post-law, but 
there are differences in race, economic status, test scores and first semester GPA. Top 
decile students after the law are more likely to be minority (Black or Hispanic) than top 
decile students before the law. After the law, they are also more likely to come from high 
schools with a higher percentage of students receiving free lunch and have lower SAT 
and ACT scores. This suggests that the law had the intended effect - it attracted 
disadvantaged and/or minority students who would not have been able to matriculate 
under traditional admission rules. 
The academic performance of this larger share of minority and disadvantaged 
students is factored into the mean post-law first semester GPA of the entire top decile 
group. As Table 1 demonstrates, mean post-law college GPA of the top decile group is 
higher than college GPA of the pre-law top decile cohort. This seems to suggest that 
admitting a larger share of non-traditional students, whose college GPA is factored into 
the post-law mean, does not undermine academic performance of the top decile group. 
This implies that non-traditional post-law students should be representative of the 
traditional pre-law cohort. 
Figure 3 further investigates changes in first semester college GPA between the 
traditional and the rank-admitted top decile cohorts. This figure displays kernel densities 
of first semester college GPA for 1997 and 2003, the year just before the implementation 
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of rank-based admissions and the last year in the data, when rank-based admissions were 
fully in effect. Figure 3 shows that the distributions of college GPA of traditional and 
rank-admitted top decile students are nearly identical. This continues to lend support to 
the conclusion that non-traditional students, who are part of the rank-admitted group, are 
academically representative of the pre-law top decile cohort. However, a straightforward 
comparison of pre- and post-law college GPA does not factor in grade inflation trends. 
Figure 4 displays first semester college GPA trends for groups of enrollees from top, 
second and third-and-below high school class deciles, and it shows that their college 
grades have been increasing over the study period. This makes a simple comparison of 
pre- and post-law college GPA uninformative. To disentangle the influence of increasing 
grades from the possible changes in academic composition of top decile students, I will 
use a difference-in-differences strategy. I.e., I will analyse trends in first semester college 
GPA of the top decile students relative to a control group that experienced similar 
changes in college GPA due to grade inflation but who were not eligible for rank-based 
admissions under the Top 10 Percent regime. I choose students who graduated in the 
second decile of their high school class to be the control group because these students 
were not eligible for rank-based admissions and, assuming grade inflation is a university-
wide phenomenon, they should have been affected by grade inflation at a rate similar to 
the top decile group. 
Examining changes in college GPA of the top decile students relative to changes 
in the GPA of the second decile group will allow me remove the influence of grade 
inflation from the law’s effect on top decile’s academic achievement. 
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3.4 Previous Literature and Empirical Strategy 
 
Previous Top 10 Percent literature uses various methods to evaluate the effects of rank- 
based admissions on student’s academic performance in college. For example, Tienda 
and Nui (2010) examine whether top decile minority students underperform relative to 
lower- ranked White students who graduate from highly competitive high schools. They 
find that compared with White students ranked at or below the third decile, top decile 
Black and Hispanic students perform as well or better. Cortes (2010) tests the 
“mismatch” hypothesis, i.e., whether minority students who attend flagship institutions 
would perform better academically at an institution whose academic prerequisites were a 
better “match” for their academic credentials. She tests this hypothesis by using the fact 
that second-and-below decile minority students were displaced into attending less 
selective institutions under the rank-based admissions regime. The “mismatch” 
hypothesis would suggest that retention and graduation rates of lower-ranked minority 
students who enrolled at less selective institutions should have improved. Yet she finds 
that college persistence and completion rates of these lower-decile minority students fell 
after rank-based admissions, which contradicts the “mismatch” hypothesis. 
Instead of focusing on a subset of top decile students, I evaluate pre- and post-law 
academic performance the entire top decile group. There are several advantages to using 
this approach. First, I am not attempting to directly identify the affected student, i.e., a 
student from the top decile of a disadvantaged high school who would not have been able 
to matriculate prior to the law. Identifying such students is difficult because the 
counterfactual, whether each enrollee would or would not have been denied admission in 
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the absence of the law, is not known. Second, focusing on the entire top decile group 
allows me to incorporate all affected students into my analysis, not only those who fall 
into a pre-defined socio-economic or racial group. Lastly, instead of comparing rank-
admitted top decile students to an ineligible subgroup from the post -law student body, I 
use the entire pre-law top decile cohort as the comparison baseline. This enables me to 
forecast how student body composition and, consequently, academic performance will be 
affected in universities that are considering a change from traditional to rank-based 
admissions. This may be important if universities wish to maintain a post-law cohort that 
is academically representative of their pre-law student body. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, a simple pre- and post-law comparison 
of top decile’s college GPA may be confounded by the effects of grade inflation. To 
disentangle true college GPA trends from trends in grade inflation, I will be using a 
difference-in-differences regression approach. In particular, I will be comparing 
academic outcomes of top decile students before and after the law relative to academic 
outcomes of admitted students who ranked in the second decile of their high school class. 
The second decile students qualify as a control group because they were not eligible for 
rank-based admissions and therefore should not have experienced a post-law influx of 
minorities and students from low-resource backgrounds. Furthermore, assuming grade 
inflation is a university-wide phenomenon, the effect of grade inflation on second 
decile’s college GPA should be similar to the effect of grade inflation on top decile’s 
GPA. In addition, the second decile cohort is a desirable control group because, relative 
to other ineligible deciles, it was less affected by the squeeze for admission seats after the 
105 
 
law, and this makes post-law academic selection of the second decile control group less 
of a concern. 
The college GPA gap between the top and second decile cohorts is the centerpiece 
of the difference-in-differences analysis used in this paper. A constant gap throughout the 
pre- and the post-law years would suggest that, controlling for grade inflation, top decile 
students after the law have performed just-as-well as the pre-law top decile students. A 
diminishing gap could suggest that academic quality of the top decile cohort decreased, 
although it could also be caused by the increasing academic quality of the control group. 
An increasing gap could be due to improved academic quality of rank-eligible 
students or due to decreased quality of the second decile students after the law. First 
semester college GPA trends previously presented in Figure 4 offer a visual analysis of 
this difference-in-differences framework. Examining Figure 4 reveals that the GPA 
difference between the top and the second decile groups translates into a roughly constant 
pre-law GPA gap and a diminishing GPA gap in the years when rank-based admissions 
were in effect. The results of this visual exercise can be quantified by the following 
difference-in-differences regression framework, 
 
      ∑ (      
    
             
)             
 ∑ (                )
    
             
     
where the control group is the second decile cohort,         is the treatment (top decile 
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group) dummy variable,     is the logarithm of first semester college GPA, and     are 
time dummies. The coefficient of interest,    measures whether first semester college 
GPA of the top decile group changes before and after the law relative to the 
corresponding pre- and post-law GPA difference for the control (second decile) group. 
An estimated coefficient of zero would imply that, controlling for grade inflation, top 
decile students after the law are academically equivalent to the top decile students before 
the law. A positive or a negative coefficient could imply that academic performance of 
post-law top decile students had either increased or decreased. 
In this difference-in-differences specification I am not controlling for student-
specific high school or pre-college academic characteristics (such as percent free lunch in 
high school or standardized test scores). This is because changes in such characteristics 
are themselves a consequence of the Top 10 Percent Law. Therefore changes in college 
GPA, if any are found, will be operating through changes in background characteristics 
induced by the implementation of rank-based admissions. If changes in academic 
performance were found, conditional regressions would then explain why the law had an 
effect on academic performance; unconditional regressions are better suited to study 
whether the law had any effect and, if so, what was the overall change in the performance 
of post-law top decile students. 
In addition to changes in college GPA, I analyze other measures of academic 
performance, such as the probability of being placed on academic probation, length of 
college enrollment and the probability of dropping out. Although these outcome variables 
are not directly affected by grade inflation, grade inflation can make the likelihood of 
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academic probation or dropping out less likely if GPA criteria for probation or dismissal 
change at a pace that is slower than the pace of grade inflation. Therefore, a difference-
in-differences specification will be applied to these analyses as well. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the estimated interaction terms from the baseline 
difference-in-differences specification presented in the previous section, using first 
semester GPA as a dependent variable; the estimates are computed relative to 1997, the 
year before rank-based admissions were implemented. The interaction term coefficients 
reported in Column 1 are nearly zero and insignificant until 1999, meaning that the gap in 
first semester college GPA between the top and second decile students remained constant 
before and for two years following the implementation of rank-based admissions. 
The lack of change in the GPA gap during the affirmative action years is not 
surprising; affirmative action policy was not rank-based and, assuming that the 
representation of minority students among the top and second decile groups did not 
change between 1994 and 1996, the college GPA gap should have remained relatively 
constant. The 1998 and 1999 interaction coefficients, two years into the rank-based 
admissions policy, are also close to zero and insignificant. This may be explained by the 
slow dissemination of the rank-based admission information to the targeted high schools. 
Except for the insignificant coefficients in 1998 and 1999, the remaining post-law 
interaction terms are increasingly negative and significant. Although this post-law 
decrease in the GPA gap could be explained solely by the declining academic 
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performance of top decile students, an equally plausible explanation could be an 
improvement in the academic performance of the second decile group. Such 
improvement in the performance of second decile students could take place because post-
law second decile enrollees are a product of intense competition among second decile 
applicants for a reduced number of non-rank-based admission slots. Competition for 
admissions could therefore cause admitted second decile students to be a highly selected 
group and, if so, violate the assumption needed for an unbiased difference-in-differences 
estimation. Therefore, changes in academic quality of the second decile cohort need to be 
investigated carefully. 
Table 3 explores possible changes in the characteristics of enrolled second decile 
students before and after the law. This table shows that post-law second decile students 
have higher SAT scores and are more likely to come from high schools with smallest 
percentage of students with free lunch. This confirms that at least some pre-college 
academic characteristics of admitted second decile students changed in the direction that 
is consistent with positive academic selection, possibly violating the assumption that 
academic quality of the control group has remained constant overtime. If the assumption 
that control group students have similar pre-college academic ability before and after the 
law does not hold, the difference-in-differences estimates presented in Table 2 may be 
overstated and the true effect of the law on academic performance of top decile students 
may in fact be either zero or positive. 
To address academic selection of the post-law second decile (control) group, I use 
propensity score matching. The matching procedure assigns a weight above one to pre-
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law control students who are most similar (in terms of pre-college characteristics) to post-
law controls and a weight below one to those whose characteristics are different. A key 
assumption of the matching procedure is that all relevant differences between the pre- 
and post-law second decile groups are captured by their pre-college observable 
characteristics. This assumption should be reasonably well satisfied because selection for 
admissions is based on the information provided on the college application, and most of 
this information is available to me through the application records database. However, I 
do not observe certain key elements that are commonly used in admissions selection, 
such as personal essays, exact high school class rank and the academic rigour of high 
school courses. My matching procedure may therefore not fully correct for the effect of 
post-law academic selection of the control students. 
To estimate the propensity weights, I use available pre-college observable 
characteristics, such as SAT/ACT scores, race, gender, citizenship status, high school’s 
socio-economic strata, and major chosen at the time of enrollment. Conditional on this set 
of observable characteristics, the magnitude of the weights is proportional to the 
probability of a pre-law control student being similar to the post-law control sample. 
Because my reference group is the post-law controls, their assigned weight is 1. Using 
these weights, I re-compute the average first semester GPA and re-run the difference-in-
differences regressions. 
Figure 5 shows first semester college GPA for the original control sample (solid 
line) and weighted GPA for the matched controls (dotted line). The dotted line is visible 
only in the pre-law period because the post-law control group was chosen as the baseline 
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to which pre-law second decile’s characteristics were matched. Because pre-law 
observations that are most similar to the post-law second decile students are weighted 
more heavily, selection should cause the average pre-law GPA of the matched second 
decile group to be higher than the original pre-law second decile cohort. Indeed, the 
dotted line that depicts the mean GPA of the matched control sample is higher, 
suggesting that post-law academic selection of the control sample is a valid concern and 
that the matching procedure was successful in correcting at least some of the admissions 
selectivity of second decile students after the law. 
I use the same difference-in-differences regression specification as in the baseline 
model but weigh pre-law second decile observations using propensity weights generated 
by the matching procedure. Columns 2-4 of Table 2 display difference-in-differences 
estimates obtained using propensity score weights. The estimates vary slightly depending 
on which matching procedure was used (kernel, radius or nearest neighbour), but all of 
them are lower than the baseline regression estimates. For example, by 2003 propensity 
score regression coefficients range from 8.3 to 9.3 percent which is below the baseline 
regression coefficient of 10.8 percent. Although smaller in magnitude, the negative sign 
and statistical significance of matched estimates remains unchanged relative to the 
baseline case. 
In the above specification, I match the pre-law second decile cohort to second 
decile students who enrolled between 1998 and 2003. However, competition among 
second decile students varied over these years and was at its most intense only in 2003, 
when class-size expansion ended. Therefore second decile students who enrolled in 2003 
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should represent the most academically selected sample and matching using only 2003-
enrolled students should generate the most conservative difference-in-differences 
estimates. 
Columns 5-7 of Table 2 display difference-in-differences estimates using weights 
generated by this most restrictive 2003-only matching procedure. As expected, 
coefficients obtained using this method are even smaller in magnitude than coefficients 
from the baseline or the 1998-2003 matched specification. However, except for the 2000 
and 2001 coefficients in the nearest neighbor specification, they remain negative and 
statistically significant. 
Furthermore, despite being matched on the most selected sample of second decile 
students, the coefficient’s magnitude is only slightly below that of the first matching 
specification. The results of this exercise show that using even the most restricted 
matched sample in the difference-in-differences regression does not eliminate 
convergence in college GPAs of the top and second decile groups after the law. Because 
observable academic quality of the second decile is now being held constant, it is likely 
that the convergence in college GPA is due to the negative effect of rank-based 
admissions on the academic composition of post-law top decile cohort. 
Another confounding factor, in addition to grade inflation and the changing 
academic ability of the control group, is the existence of a college GPA ceiling. This 
GPA ceiling exists because college students cannot get a first semester GPA above 4.0; 
therefore, students whose first semester grades are near or at this 4.0 GPA threshold will 
experience little or no grade inflation, while students with a relatively low GPA will 
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experience larger increases in GPA due to inflation. As a result, the GPA trend of a 
cohort composed of students near or at the threshold will be relatively flat while the GPA 
trend of a cohort that is farther away from the threshold will be increasing. Top decile 
students have on average higher college GPA than second decile students, therefore top 
decile students are more likely to be at or near the 4.0 college GPA threshold. As a result 
the decreasing gap in college GPA between the top and the second decile groups may be 
solely due to the GPA ceiling effect rather than to the decreased academic ability of the 
post-law top decile cohort. 
I test for the presence of GPA ceiling using two approaches. First, I replace the 
existing control group of second decile students with top decile students from non-Texas 
high schools. These students are not eligible for the law due to their out-of-state status, 
therefore they serve as a valid control group. In addition, because these students also 
graduated at the top of their out-of-state high school classes they should have college 
GPAs that are comparable to the GPAs of rank-admitted top decile students. In fact, as 
Figure 6 shows, mean college GPA of the out-of-state top decile group is consistently 
higher than mean GPA of rank-admitted Texas students. Because the GPA of out-of-state 
students is higher, in the presence of inflation they should be even more bounded by the 
GPA ceiling than in-state top decile students; therefore the GPA trend of out-of-state top 
decile students should be less steep than the trend of rank-eligible students. If GPA 
ceiling is a valid confounding factor, the GPA gap between in-state and out-of-state top 
decile students should converge overtime and cause the difference-in-differences 
estimates to become more negative as grade inflation intensifies. 
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However, Figure 6 does not suggest that the GPA gap between in-state and out-
of-state top decile students is converging. In fact, from 2000 onward the gap seems to 
widen. Column 1 of Table 4 presents the difference-in-differences interaction term 
coefficients computed using the out-of-state top decile students as controls. The 
magnitude of the coefficients is close to zero and, although the signs of some are 
consistent with the GPA ceiling hypothesis, none of these coefficients are significant. 
Although this test does not disprove that the GPA ceiling is binding, I find no strong 
evidence in support of this hypothesis either. 
The second test that I perform to determine whether GPA ceiling may be a valid 
confounding factor is to use quantile regression analysis within my original difference-in- 
differences framework (with second decile students as controls). For example, using the 
median in the difference-in-differences regressions should ameliorate the confounding 
effect of grade inflation and the GPA ceiling because the median top decile student is less 
likely to be near the 4.0 GPA bound. Therefore, comparing the median college GPA of 
the top decile to the median GPA of the second decile group should produce difference-
in-differences estimates that are less confounded by the GPA ceiling. 
Column 2 of Table 4 displays the coefficients of a difference-in-differences 
quantile regression specification using the median. The estimated coefficients are lower 
than the baseline case; for example by 2003 the estimated quantile regression coefficient 
is about 9.8 percent relative to the baseline difference-in-differences estimate of 10.8 
percent. Although suggestive of a potential confounding effect of the GPA ceiling, the 
difference between the baseline and the quantile regression coefficients is small. Only the 
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2003 interaction term is significant; however, years 2000 though 2002 are also 
marginally significant. 
A caveat of this quantile difference-in-differences analysis lies in the fact that 
these quantile regression estimates do not incorporate propensity score correction for the 
post-law academic selection of second decile students (hence the comparison is made 
relative to the unmatched baseline case). This is due to the fact that statistical software I 
use is unable to integrate propensity score weights into a quantile regression framework. 
Since the post-law squeeze for admission slots mostly affected second decile students at 
the low end of the ability distribution, the median regression should not be greatly 
affected by the selection bias. However, this bias becomes a valid concern when lower 
quantiles of college GPA are analysed.  
Figure 7 and Table 5 present estimates of the likelihood of academic probation. 
Criteria for academic probation at UT Austin have not changed over the study period – 
all students with a GPA below 2.0 were placed on probation, regardless of how many 
total college hours they have accumulated. Because the GPA threshold for probation does 
not change over the study period, grade inflation can decrease the likelihood of probation 
over time because fewer students will remain under the 2.0 GPA probation threshold as 
grades continue to increase. The trends displayed in Figure 7 support this hypothesis. 
Both the top and second decile students experience a decrease in the likelihood of 
academic probation over time. Because academic composition of top and second decile 
students remained constant though the pre-law period, the decrease in the probability of 
being placed on academic probation can be attributed to grade inflation.  
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During the pre-law period, the rate of decrease in the likelihood of being placed 
on probation is similar for both top and second deciles. The post-law probation trends are 
different. The probability of being placed on probation for top decile students remains 
constant over the post-law period, but it continues to decrease for second decile students. 
This convergence in the probabilities of probation between the top and second deciles 
could be explained either by the post-law increase in the academic quality of second 
decile students or by a post-law influx of worse-performing top decile students who are 
more likely to be placed on probation after the law. 
I test these competing hypotheses using difference-in-differences methods 
described earlier in this paper and regress a dummy indicating whether or not a student 
has been placed on probation on year dummies, a top decile dummy and the interaction of 
top decile and year dummies. The interaction terms should quantify the causal effect of 
the law on the probability of probation, holding grade inflation constant. A propensity 
score adjustment is applied to account for changes in academic composition of the second 
decile group.  
Table 5 presents baseline and propensity score adjusted difference-in-differences 
estimates of the law on the probability of academic probation. The unadjusted estimates 
are displayed in column 1. The suggest that, controlling for grade inflation, post-law top 
decile students are about 8 percentage points more likely to be on academic probation 
than pre-law top decile students. Adjusting for selection using propensity score matching 
does not change the estimates by very much: kernel and radius matching methods 
produce similar coefficients, while nearest neighbor method generates a larger (in 
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absolute value) coefficient. This could be due to the fact that the sample size used in the 
nearest neighbor regression is substantially smaller than in other matched regressions. 
Overall, these results suggest that, controlling for grade inflation, post-law top decile 
students are more likely to be placed on academic probation relative to pre-law top decile 
students, even after adjusting for grade inflation and the control group selection. 
In addition to academic probation, I also use length of college enrollment and 
probability of graduation variables as a proxy for college academic performance. Table 6 
presents summary statistics for length of observed enrollment, by year of matriculation. 
Column one displays the percentages of pre-law top decile students whose last 
observation in the data occurred zero, one, two three, four and five or more years after 
matriculation. For example, about 2 percent of pre-law top decile students leave UT 
Austin less than a year after enrolling, meaning they are only observed for one semester. 
About 48 percent of students are observed for four years and 22 percent are observed for 
five years. Columns 2 through 5 present similar statistics for the post-law period, years 
1998 through 2003.  
Table 6 conveys two messages. First, comparing percentages within the same row 
summarizes trends in length of enrollment across years. Although these percentages are 
not constant across years, no obvious trends seem to exist. Comparing within a column, 
particularly the last observation within each column, highlights the problem of censoring. 
Censoring arises because the last recorded year of matriculation is 2003 and the last data 
point is recorded in 2004; therefore, students who enrolled in 2003 can only be observed 
for one year, students who enrolled in 2002 for two years, etc. The best estimate for 
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graduation rates can therefore be inferred from the pre-law period and post-law students 
who enrolled between 1998 and 1999 and are observed for 5 or more years. 
Although Table 6 does not reveal any prominent trends in the length of 
enrollment of top decile students after the law, lack of a trend could be a product of 
opposing forces. For example, a decrease in length of enrollment due to inferior academic 
quality can be cancelled out by an increase in length of enrollment due to grade inflation 
and reduced likelihood of academic dismissal. I employ the previously discussed 
difference-in-differences strategy to disentangle these effects. 
Table 7 presents interaction coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions 
where the dependent variable is the length of enrollment at UT Austin, and the 
independent variables are time dummies, a top decile dummy and the interaction of time 
and top decile dummies. As before, the interaction terms capture the change in top 
decile’s length of enrollment before and after the law, while taking into account changes 
in grade inflation. Each column of Table 7 represents a separate regression, where the 
dependent variable is zero, one, two, three and four or more years of enrollment. The 
interaction term on the year before the law went into effect, 1997, is omitted. 
Overall, coefficients in Table 7 do not point to a major change in the length of 
enrollment of top decile students before and after the law. Censoring makes it difficult to 
infer whether there is a post-law pattern for length of enrollment that exceeds two years 
(columns 4 and 5). Estimates in columns 1 through 3 are less affected by censoring 
because these regressions capture students with up to two years of enrollment and 
therefore includes students who enrolled as late as 2001. Although some coefficients in 
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columns 1 through 3 are significant, there is no consistent post-law pattern. Column 2 
does have positive and significant coefficients in the post-law period, but Column 2 
coefficients are also positive and significant in the pre-law period. This only indicates a 
change with respect to the year 1997, which is omitted, and not with respect to the entire 
pre-law time block. 
Length of enrollment analysis can in principle be used as a proxy for the 
likelihood of dropping out. However, censoring and students transferring from UT Austin 
to other colleges can cause major discrepancies between these two variables. Therefore, I 
separately compute the probability of dropping out, by restricting the sample to students 
who enrolled in 1999 or before because this allows me to observe a student for 5 years or 
longer. In addition, I flag students as dropouts only if they graduated before 1999, have a 
missing value for graduation year and have a cumulative GPA below 2.5. Students with 
GPAs above 2.5 are not likely to have been on academic probation, and if their year of 
graduation is missing they likely transferred to another school rather than dropped out. 
Table 8 presents difference-in-difference regression results on the probability of 
dropping out. The interaction coefficients on the years 1998 and 1999 are not significant, 
indicating that top decile students in 1998 and 1999 have dropout probabilities that are 
similar to top decile students in 1997. However, in first semester GPA analysis I showed 
that the effects of the law do not become large and significant until several years after the 
law’s implementation. Therefore, lack of results can mean either that the law did not 
change dropout rates among top decile students or that this change occurred after 1999. 
At the beginning of this paper, I showed that post-law top decile students have, on 
119 
 
average, lower first semester GPA than pre-law top decile students. The final focus on the 
paper is on whether post-law top decile students “catch up” in subsequent years. In 
particular, I focus on GPA in the fall of the second, third and fourth years and study 
whether the gap between the pre- and post-law top decile GPA is diminished as post-law 
students progress through college. 
Table 9 displays difference-in-differences estimates from four separate 
regressions, where the dependent variables are semester GPAs in the Fall of first, second, 
third and fourth year. The interaction coefficients presented in Table 9 capture the 
difference in Fall GPA between post-law top decile students in the Fall of year one 
through four and pre-law top decile students in the Fall of the same year. Therefore, if the 
GPA gap is reduced over time, coefficients should diminish when compared across 
columns. This is, indeed, the case. By the Fall of their fourth year, top decile students 
who enroll in 2000 are not statistically significantly different from fourth year students 
who enrolled in 1997, even though their first year GPA was, on average, 7 percentage 
points lower. Other coefficients remain significantly different in the last year we observe 
students, but they are all smaller than the corresponding first year coefficients. 
Although these regression results account for censoring—for example, Fall of 
fourth year coefficients are estimated only up to 2001—they do not account for selection 
that can result from dropping out. Part of the GPA gap reduction illustrated in Table 9 
could be due to the fact that by the fourth year poorly performing post-law top decile 
students drop out and pre- and post-law samples become similar.  
To test whether the gap reduction is due to selection induced by the inferior 
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quality of post-law versus pre-law dropouts, I subset all regressions to students who are 
still enrolled at UT Austin in the Fall of their fourth year. Table 10 presents the estimates 
computed using this sample. The first column shows that initial effects, in the Fall of first 
year, are much smaller when dropouts are excluded. The third and fourth year effects, 
however, are similar to Table 9. Furthermore, the trend of declining GPA gap from the 
first to the fourth year is much less pronounced than in Table 9. This suggests that the 
majority of the reduction of GPA gap is due to poorly-performing post-law top decile 
students who drop out. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The popularity of rank-based admissions has been growing in recent years. In addition to 
Texas, other states such as California and Florida have adopted admissions systems based 
on high school class rank. The use of such plans has even been considered overseas – 
French senate, for example, has been debating the implementation of a rank-based 
admissions system (French-American Foundation Policy Brief, 2008). It is therefore 
important to understand the impact of such admissions policies on the educational 
outcomes of its intended beneficiaries. 
Critics of rank-based admissions argue that the post-implementation increase in 
racial and socio-economic diversity may have come at the expense or lower academic 
performance. My findings do suggest that the top decile cohort, whose racial and socio-
economic characteristics changed after the law, experienced some post-law decline in 
college GPA. However, these effects are point estimates, and it is not yet clear where in 
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the GPA distribution this decline may have occurred. I.e., an overall 9 percentage point 
decline in post-law college GPA of the top decile group could be due to an influx of a 
few poorly performing students, a large increase in the number of students slightly below 
the mean or a displacement of the distribution of affected students’ academic ability to 
the left relative to the traditional cohort. Kernel densities previously presented in Figure 3 
do not show prominent swells in any section of the post-law college GPA distribution 
which suggests that the last explanation is most likely. 
Although I find that some top decile students admitted after the law may be less 
prepared for college than pre-law top decile students, my findings do not imply that the 
distribution of academic ability among all UT Austin students changed pre- and post-law. 
This is because less well-prepared top decile enrollees may be displacing lower decile 
graduates from competitive schools. If academic ability of these displaced lower decile 
students is similar to that of non-traditional top decile students, the net change in the 
overall distribution of academic ability may sum to zero. 
Finally, the analysis in this paper has only focused on first semester college GPA 
which represents the short-term effect on academic achievement. I have preliminarily 
analysed the GPA gap in subsequent semesters and did not find a convergence in college 
GPA trends between top and second decile groups. Although this may suggest that rank-
admitted students quickly adjust to the academic rigours of a flagship university, 
robustness analysis showed that first semester GPA of students who survive into second 
semester and beyond does not show a converging GPA gap either. Therefore, attrition 
may be an important factor, and it is possible that in addition to not performing as well as 
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traditional students in their first semester, some rank-admitted students may also be 
leaving the university. This is an important consequence of the rank-based admissions 
policy and will be addressed in my future analysis. 
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Figure 3.1: Enrollment Rates at UT Austin, Blacks and Hispanics 
 
Note: The year of Top 10 Percent Law’s implementation is 1998, it is marked with a vertical bar. 
Enrollment rates are computed as a percentage of all UT Austin enrollees in a given year. 
 
Figure 3.2: Enrollment Rates at UT Austin, by High School Class Rank 
 
Note: The year of Top 10 Percent Law’s implementation is 1998, it is marked with a vertical bar. 
Enrollment rates are computed as a percentage of all UT Austin enrollees in a given year.  
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of First Semester College GPA in 1997 and 2003,  
Top Decile Students at UT Austin  
 
Notes: Kernel densities are used to estimate the distribution of first semester GPA in 1997 and 2003. The 
Top 10 Percent Law was implemented in 1998, distributions are computed for one year before and five 
years after the law went into effect. 
 
Figure 3.4: First Semester College GPA of Enrolled UT Austin Students, 
 Top 10 vs. Second Decile of High School Graduation Class 
 
Notes: The year of Top 10 Percent Law’s implementation is 1998, it is marked with a vertical bar. Top10 
TX HS group consists of students eligible for rank-based admission; second decile TX HS students were 
not eligible for automatic admission.  
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Figure 3.5: Mean GPA of the Second Decile Cohort, 
Original and Propensity Score Weighted 
 
Notes: Weighted pre-law GPA (dashed line) is computed using weights derived from a nearest neighbor 
propensity matching model; 1998-2003 data to estimate the weights. The weight for the pre-law sample is 
proportional to the probability of having characteristics similar to the post-law sample. The weight for the 
post-law sample equals one. 
 
Figure 3.6: Mean GPA of In-State and Out-of-State Top Decile Students 
 
Notes: In-state top decile students graduated from a Texas high school and are thus eligible for rank-based 
admissions. Out-of-state students are not eligible for rank-based admissions because they did not graduate 
from a Texas high school.  
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Figure 3.7: Probability of Academic Probation, UT Austin
 
Notes: Sample consists of students who enrolled at UT Austin between 1991 and 2003 and who graduated 
in either top or second decile of their high school class. A student is placed on academic probation if his or 
her college GPA in any given semester falls below 2.0. 95% confidence intervals are displayed for each 
mean. 
  
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
P
ro
b
.
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Year Admitted
Top 10 TXHS 2nd dec. TXHS
127 
 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Top Decile First-Year UT Austin Enrollees 
 
 
pre-98  
Top10, TX HS 
post-98  
Top10, TX HS 
Male 0.436 0.426 
 (0.496) (0.495) 
Black 0.0256 0.0431 
 (0.158) (0.203) 
Hispanic 0.144 0.178 
 (0.351) (0.382) 
Asian 0.201 0.205 
 (0.401) (0.403) 
White 0.625 0.571 
 (0.484) (0.495) 
HS econ status 1.841 1.964 
 (1.075) (1.123) 
SAT/ACT scores 72.67 69.59 
 (20.51) (23.79) 
First semester GPA 3.188 3.266 
 (0.752) (0.723) 
Observations 15961 19987 
Notes: Displays the mean of each variable (standard deviation in parentheses) for students enrolled at 
UT Austin in the Fall of their first year. Although data is available starting in 1991, the pre-law period 
in this table spans the years 1994 to 1997 because some variables were not made available until 1994; 
post-law period covers the years from 1998 to 2003. HS econ status indicates quartiles of students 
receiving free lunch (1=25% or less, 4=75% or more). SAT/ACT score variable groups SAT/ACT 
scores into bins (bins are not equally distributed throughout the SAT/ACT score distribution). Higher 
SAT/ACT score bin represents a higher test score.  
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Table 3.2: Difference-in-Differences Regression Results: 
 Interaction Coefficients for the Baseline and Matched Controls Scenarios 
 
                                           matching on 1998-2003             matching on 2003 only 
 baseline kernel radius integer kernel radius integer 
Log(GPA)        
1994*top10 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042) 
1995*top10 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.000 -0.008 -0.010 -0.038 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.040) 
1996*top10 -0.030* -0.030* -0.027 -0.011 -0.029* -0.032 0.010 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.046) 
1998*top10 -0.021 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 -0.017 -0.015 -0.055 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.038) 
1999*top10 -0.014 -0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.013 -0.017 0.026 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.041) 
2000*top10 -0.073*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.038 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.040) 
2001*top10 -0.056*** -0.043*** -0.036** -0.031* -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.023 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.040) 
2002*top10 -0.074*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.074** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.037) 
2003*top10 -0.108*** -0.095*** -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.089*** -0.081*** -0.080** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.031) 
Observation
s 
41,802 41,798 41,682 40,833 41,800 41,696 31,029 
Notes: Reported estimates are the interaction terms of the following regression specification:    (   )   
               (        )      . Controls in both baseline and matched specifications are 
students who graduated in the second decile of their high school class. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.  
129 
 
Table 3.3: Characteristics of Enrolling Second Decile Students at UT Austin,  
Before and After the Top10 Percent Law 
 
 1994-1997 1998-2003 Difference 
Hours earned 14.97 15.33 0.361*** 
SAT/ACT scores 65.95 67.16 1.097** 
Male 0.496 0.483 -0.014 
Black 0.0317 0.0297 -0.002 
Hispanic 0.147 0.134 -0.011 
White 0.664 0.651 -0.015 
Asian 0.152 0.180 0.027*** 
Citizen 0.945 0.954 0.008* 
HS 0-25 free lunch 0.638 0.631 -0.006 
HS 25-50 free lunch 0.145 0.194 0.050*** 
HS 50-75 free lunch 0.0933 0.0832 -0.010* 
HS 75-100 free lunch 0.0647 0.0526 -0.012** 
Private HS 0.0591 0.0385 -0.020*** 
Observations 5279 8487  
Notes: Computations are based on second decile students enrolled at UT Austin in the Fall of their 
Freshman year. Variables are obtained from the college application records. Mean of each variable is 
reported; significance levels are indicated as follows: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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Table 3.4: Testing for the GPA Ceiling Effect: Diff-Diff Regression with Out-of-state 
Top Decile Controls and Quantile Diff-Diff Regression with Second Decile Controls 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Top10 not TX Median 
1994*top10 -.014 .005 
 (.033) (.023) 
1995*top10 -.041 .005 
 (.033) (.022) 
1996*top10 .006 -.034 
 (.033) (.031) 
1998*top10 -.027 -.005 
 (.037) (.021) 
1999*top10 .056 -.005 
 (.038) (.021) 
2000*top10 .023 -.038 
 (.036) (.024) 
2001*top10 .013 -.038 
 (.036) (.028) 
2002*top10 -.011 -.038 
 (.034) (.026) 
2003*top10 -.013 -.098∗∗∗ 
 (.035) (.026) 
Observations 30,573 41,802 
Notes: The first column reports interaction term coefficients obtained using out-of-state top decile 
students as controls. The second column reports results of a median difference-in-differences 
specification with second decile students as the control group; standard errors of the quantile 
regression are bootstrapped. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.5: Difference-in-Differences Results for Likelihood of Academic Probation,  
Interaction Coefficients for the Baseline and Matched Controls Scenarios 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
probation baseline kernel radius integer 
1994*top10 -0.029* -0.027 -0.024 0.084* 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.047) 
1995*top10 0.015 0.015 0.022 0.038 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.052) 
1996*top10 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.091* 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.051) 
1998*top10 -0.010 -0.017 -0.010 0.062 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.042) 
1999*top10 0.007 -0.000 0.007 0.080* 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.042) 
2000*top10 0.033** 0.026 0.034* 0.106** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.042) 
2001*top10 0.046*** 0.039** 0.046*** 0.119*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.042) 
2002*top10 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.128*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.041) 
2003*top10 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.147*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.042) 
Observations 42,289 42,286 42,258 38,665 
Notes: Regression sample includes students who graduated in the top or second decile of their Texas 
high school class and enrolled at UT Austin between 1994 and 2003; the period from 1991 through 
1993 is not included because percent free lunch data is not available during that period. Reported 
estimates are the interaction terms of the following regression specification:                     
       (        )      . Controls in both baseline and matched specifications are students who 
graduated in the second decile of their high school class. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.  
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Length of Observed Enrollment at UT Austin, 
By Year of Matriculation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years 
Enrolled: 
Top 10,  
1991-1997 
Top 10,  
1998-1999 
Top 10, 
2000 
Top 10,  
2001 
Top10, 
2002 
Top10, 
2003 
zero years 0.0215 0.0166 0.0148 0.0130 0.0210 0.0172 
 (0.145) (0.128) (0.121) (0.113) (0.144) (0.130) 
       
one year 0.0637 0.0476 0.0418 0.0595 0.0606 0.983 
 (0.244) (0.213) (0.200) (0.237) (0.239) (0.130) 
       
two years 0.0463 0.0343 0.0391 0.0397 0.918  
 (0.210) (0.182) (0.194) (0.195) (0.274)  
       
three years 0.0920 0.0983 0.121 0.888   
 (0.289) (0.298) (0.326) (0.316)   
       
four years 0.481 0.552 0.783    
 (0.500) (0.497) (0.412)    
       
five 
years+ 
0.217 0.191     
 (0.412) (0.393)     
       
Num. obs. 16020 6767 3300 3376 3848 4198 
       
Notes: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. The mean indicates percentage of 
students who were last observed as enrolled x years after the year of matriculation (graduated, dropped out 
or censored). Column one subsets to students who matriculated between 1991 and 1997, column two – to 
students who matriculated between 1998-1999, etc. Last year in which individuals can be observed is 2004.  
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Table 3.7: Difference-in-Differences Results: Length of Observed Enrollment 
By Year of Matriculation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 zero years one year two years three years four years 
1991*Top10 0.008 0.027*** -0.013 -0.030*** -0.049** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1992*Top10 0.001 0.018* 0.008 -0.025** -0.038** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.020) 
1993*Top10 -0.003 0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.047** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1994*Top10 -0.003 0.025** -0.003 -0.034*** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1995*Top10 -0.004 0.028*** 0.004 -0.007 -0.035* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1996*Top10 0.001 0.030*** 0.010 -0.021* -0.026 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1998*Top10 0.001 0.036*** 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) 
1999*Top10 0.007 0.013 -0.004 -0.020* -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) 
2000*Top10 -0.094*** 0.043*** 0.014* -0.010  
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)  
2001*Top10 -0.005 0.044*** 0.003   
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)   
2002*Top10 0.008 0.044***    
 (0.006) (0.009)    
2003*Top10 0.007     
 (0.007)     
Observations 74,225 68,202 61,096 54,626 47,242 
Notes: Regression sample includes students who graduated in the top or second decile of their Texas high 
school class and enrolled at UT Austin between 1991 and 2003. Students are last observed in 2004. 
Reported estimates are the interaction terms of the following regression specification: 
                                     (        )      . Controls are students who graduated 
in the second decile of their high school class. Presented results are from the baseline difference-in-
difference specifications -- no matching is used. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 
95% and 90%, respectively   
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Table 3.8: Difference-in-Differences Results: Probability of Dropping Out 
By Year of Matriculation 
 
dropout  
  
1991*Top10 0.033** 
 (0.015) 
1992*Top10 0.033** 
 (0.015) 
1993*Top10 0.016 
 (0.015) 
1994*Top10 0.010 
 (0.015) 
1995*Top10 0.020 
 (0.015) 
1996*Top10 0.032** 
 (0.015) 
1998*Top10 0.024 
 (0.015) 
1999*Top10 0.001 
 (0.014) 
  
Observations 47,242 
Notes: Regression sample includes students who graduated in the top or second decile of their Texas high 
school class and enrolled at UT Austin between 1991 and 1999. Students are last observed in 2004. A 
student is flagged as a dropout if their graduation year is missing and their cumulative gpa is below 2.5. 
Reported estimates are the interaction terms of the following regression specification: 
                                     (        )      . Controls are students who graduated 
in the second decile of their high school class. Presented results are from the baseline difference-in-
difference specifications -- no matching is used. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 
95% and 90%, respectively   
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Table 3.9: Difference-in-Differences Results: Semester GPA in Years One-Four, 
By Year of Matriculation 
 
 Fall 1st Year Fall 2nd Year Fall 3rd Year Fall 4th Year 
 loggpa loggpa loggpa loggpa 
     
1991*Top10 -0.026 -0.020* -0.005 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1992*Top10 -0.015 -0.035*** -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1993*Top10 -0.008 -0.023** -0.020* -0.013 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1994*Top10 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.020** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1995*Top10 -0.001 -0.022** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1996*Top10 -0.025 -0.024** -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
1998*Top10 -0.015 -0.018* -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
1999*Top10 -0.014 -0.022** -0.021** -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
2000*Top10 -0.074*** -0.042*** -0.027*** -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
2001*Top10 -0.054*** -0.031*** -0.022** -0.021** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
2002*Top10 -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.031***  
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)  
2003*Top10 -0.103*** -0.067***   
 (0.016) (0.011)   
     
Observations 53,227 48,122 40,830 33,702 
Notes: Regression sample includes students who graduated in the top or second decile of their Texas high 
school class and enrolled at UT Austin between 1991 and 2003. Students are last observed in 2004. 
Regressions include students who drop out before the fall of their 4
th
 year. Reported estimates are the 
interaction terms of the following regression specification:                               
(        )      . Controls are students who graduated in the second decile of their high school class. 
Presented results are from the baseline difference-in-difference specifications -- no matching is used. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively   
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Table 3.10: Difference-in-Differences Results: Semester GPA in Years One-Four, 
Subset to Students Who Survive to Year Four 
 
 Fall 1st Year Fall 2nd Year Fall 3rd Year Fall 4th Year 
 loggpa loggpa loggpa loggpa 
     
1991*top10 -0.020 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
1992*top10 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
1993*top10 -0.003 -0.016 -0.017* -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
1994*top10 -0.000 0.004 0.010 0.018* 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
1995*top10 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
1996*top10 -0.021 -0.014 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
1998*top10 -0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
1999*top10 -0.015 -0.021** -0.022** -0.017* 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
2000*top10 -0.029** -0.025*** -0.022** -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2001*top10 -0.030** -0.021** -0.022** -0.018* 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
     
Observations 31,928 31,931 31,931 31,931 
Notes: Regression sample includes students who graduated in the top or second decile of their Texas high 
school class and enrolled at UT Austin between 1991 and 2001. Students are last observed in 2004. All 
regressions are subset to students who survive until the Fall of their 4
th
 year.Reported estimates are the 
interaction terms of the following regression specification:                               
(        )      . Controls are students who graduated in the second decile of their high school class. 
Presented results are from the baseline difference-in-difference specifications -- no matching is used. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.  
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